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ABSTRACT
The problem of this study was to investigate the effects
of dyadic attraction upon the coalescing behavior of threeperson groups. I^adio attraction was expected to Influence
both the frequency with which coalitions were initiated and
formed and the agreed upon division of a monetary payoff.

Interpersonal attraction was conceived in terms of outcomes, rewards minus costs, experienced in the process of
interacting. One person *s attraction for another was seen
as varying directly with the reward-cost ratio he experienced
in his interactions with that person.
Based on this exchange
theory of interaction, a distinction was made between three
types of relationships: non-formed (strangers), in which
there was no prior dyadic experience or attraction; forming
(acquaintances), in which some Involvement and prior
experience was reported; and formed (friends), in which
greater Involvement, commitment and obligations were
reciprocated.

Two major coalition theories were considered; minimum
resource and minimum power theories. Minimum resource theory
predicts that coalitions will form in which the total resources
or powers are as small as possible while still being sufficient
Payoffs are divided according to a
to control the outcomes.
parity norm *— the belief that a person ought to get from an
agreement an amount proportionate to what he brought into it.
Minimum power theory emphasizes a rational analysis of the
outcomes. A person's pivotal power is the proportion of times
his resources can change a losing coalition into a winning one.
be
It was predicted that friends and acquaintances would
more cooperative in an experimental game than would strangers,
but that friends would be more competitive than acquaintances.
Cooperative behavior was defined as a high frequency of dyad

Initiations and alliances together with proportionate
that males
divisions of the payoff. It was further predicted
would be more competitive than females.
friends (or
Sixty same-sex groups were composed of two
two acquaintances) and one stranger,
choices,
Attracted dyads were reciprocal soclometrlc
competitive board game was used similar
3 $ and 2 were assign
cames like Parchesl. Resources of
of twelve game .
equally often to all subjects before each

xl

?Sr

^changeable

As predicted, friend dyads Initiated and formed
more
coalitions than stranger control dyads. But contrary
to
expectations, acquaintance dyads did not coalesce more
frequently than friend or stranger dyads. Moreover, dyads
did not differ In their divisions of payoff. Friends played
to maximize their Joint outcomes, while acquaintances and
strangers generally played to maximize their Individual
outcomes. While males Initiated and formed significantly
more coalitions than females, no differences were found In
the divisions of payoff. Both males and females adhered to
the parity norm.

Support for minimum resource theory was obtained from
stranger control dyads, (2) coalitions Initiated and
formed during the first block of three games. (3) divisions
of payoff throughout the twelve games, and {h) recipients of
coalition offers. Minimum power predictions were supported
by (1) changes In the frequency of coalitions initiated suid
formed after the first block of games, and (2) friend dyads.
(1)

It was concluded that friends were more cooperative than
acquaintances because they found It financially more rewarding
to cooperate them to compete. The monetary payoff made It
too costly for friends not to cooperate. It was suggested
that friends would rival and compete against one another only
It was also
In situations of low cost to their relationship.
concluded that males were generally concerned with winning
(exploitative behavior) whereas females were more concerned
with arriving at an equitable outcome (accommodative behavior).
Finally, It was concluded that minimum resource theorj^
currently offers the best explanation of coalescing behavior.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The development of experimental researoh with small
social groups has been accompanied by an Increasing Interest
In the effects of various Intra-group relationships on the

performance of Individual members and of the group-as-a-

whole (l^lbaut & Kelley, 1959)

.

Experimental studies of

coalition formation have been recipients of this Interest.
As In other small group research, numerous experimental

situations have been studied employing designs which range

from observations of member Interactions to empirically
quantifiable methods.

For the most part, however, research

has neglected prior existing relationships among coalition
participants.

One key relationship Is the degree of liking

among gi*oup members.

Only one study has Investigated the

effect of prior associations upon the frequency of coalition

formation

(Garrison,

196lb).

In this study all groups were

composed of three men from one fraternity house and two

from another.

No attempt was made to systematically vary

the degree of liking among the fraternity brothers.
the
The problem of the present study was to Investigate

behavior of
effects of dyadic attraction upon the coalescing

three-person groups.

I^adlc attraction was expected to

coalitions were
Influence both the frequency with which
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Initiated and formed and the agreed upon division of
a monetary payoff.
It Is suggested that outcomes In an Interpersonal

situation are more predictable when one Interacts with an

acquaintance or friend than when one Interacts with a
stranger.

Therefore, It does not seem unreasonable to expect

coalescing behavior to vary as a function of the degree of

attraction among group members.

Thlbaut and Kelley (1959)

also "speculate that a close friendship heightens expectations that the coalition will be effective by Increasing

each person *s feeling that he can take for granted or
readily Induce the other person *s support for his actions.
It Is also likely that close friendship reflects a more

complete correspondence of outcomes or commonality of
Interests" (pp. 209-210).
A three-person experimental setting was selected for

this study because of the various Inter-relatlonshlps which

could be analyzed.

Both two- and three-person situations

allow the participants to compete and bargain over available
rewards or to work cooperatively toward Joint rewarding
outcomes.

However, three-person situations, such as a

coalition formation game, are not restricted to dyadic
Interactions.
the bargaining.

A third person may actively participate In

This person not only enters Into the

alternativ e
dynamic aspects of the game, but also becomes an

for the other participants.

This Is particularly Important

3

when dyads varying In attraction are placed
Into a competitive game setting. Each member of the dyad has

available to

him another person with whom he can Interact and
bargain.
In Slmmel's (1950) terms ^ the third person can
become an

Intermediary between the other two.

It Is also possible

that the attracted dyad will band together against the third
person, or that It may split, with one member of the dyad

coalescing with the third person.

Chapter II presents theory and research relevant to
Interpersonal attraction.

Based upon an exchange theory of

Interaction, a distinction Is made among non-formed relationships (strangers), forming relationships (acquaintances),

and formed relationships (friends).

Differential effects of

varying degrees of attraction upon behaviors emitted In a

competitive game setting are considered.

Chapter III

reviews and contrasts three theories of coalition formation:

minimum resource theory, minimum power theory, and anticompetitive theory.

Several general conclusions are made

based on relevant empirical evidence.

Hypotheses which

guided this study are also presented.

Chapter IV describes the experimental design and
procedure as well as the coalition game played by the threeperson group.

Chapter V analyzes the results obtained from

the experimental situation by groups and by dyads varying
In attraction.

Findings relevant to the three theories of

coalition formation are also presented.

Finally, Chapter VI

disouBses and interprets the results In relation to the
attraction and coalition theories.
I

Methodological

%

considerations and further x*esearch are also discussed.

CHAPTER
INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION!

II
THEORY AND RESEARCH

Theory and research relating to Interpersonal attraction
may be categorized Into antecedents (determinants) and consequences (effects).

Unfortunately, the major emphasis has

been upon the antecedents rather than upon the consequences
of Interpersonal attraction.

As a result, "compared with

the empirical findings regarding the antecedents of liking,

those relevant to consequences are far less clear-cut and

definitive.

This is reflected in the relative lack of

theoretical concern with the effects of attraction" (Lott &
Lott, 1965, P. 299).

The present study Is primarily concerned with the

effects of varying degrees of attraction upon behavior In a

competitive setting.

Will a person behave differently In a

face-to-face competitive situation If he is with a friend or
an acquaintance rather than a stranger?

In the theoretical

discussion which follows, a distinction Is made among nonformed, forming, and formed relationships.

It Is suggested

exists Is a
that the point In time at which a relationship

comprising the
major determlnemt of the behavior of those

relationship.

two
If the amount of attraction between

able to predict
persons can be determined, one ought to be
behaviors in competitive
the nature of their individual or Joint

•
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situations.

The researoh section of this chapter
reviews empirical
evidence on the effects of varying degrees of
attraction

upon cooperative-competitive behavior.

research has been conducted.

Uttle relevant

That which has been reported

was concerned with the Prisoner's Dilemma situation, a
twoperson competitive gcune.

For a broader and more Inclusive

review of the literature, particularly with regard to the

antecedents and consequences of attraction, the reader Is
referred to Byrne (196?) and Lott and Lott (I965),
Theory

Among the more Important aspects of social life are
the Interpersonal relationships that one forms with others
in his environment.

From our past experiences we know that

some relationships are highly rewarding and that our Involve-

ment In them Is facilitated by the high returns we receive
from them.

Other relationships may prove very costly to us

and our continued Involvement In them depends upon whether

we consider the demands made of us to be reasonable.

In

other words, we tend to form and remain In relationships

which provide us with high outcomes; where the costs incurred
are less than the rewards received.

Interpersonal attraction, then, is conceived In terms
Interacting
of rewards and costs experienced In the process of
(Homans, I96I; Secord

Ss

Backman, 196^; Thlbaut & Kelley, 1959)
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The attraction of one person for another will
vary directly
with the reward-cost ratio he experiences In his

Interactions

with that person.
Interaction:

Attraction is also a positive function of

the greater the Interaction^ the greater the

attraction (Lott & Lott^ 1965).

By definition. Interaction

Implies mutual or reciprocal Influence,
person affect the other.

The actions of each

They must communicate with each

other, reward each other, and generally satisfy each other's

expectations.

The relationship is essentially an exchange;

Its participants are continually in the process of trading

rewards and costs, i.e., bargaining.

Reciprocity, then. Is

considered a necessary condition for liking.
It is assumed that every individual voluntarily enters

and remains in a relationship only as long as It Is adequately

satisfactory In terms of his rewards and costs.

Outcomes

(rewards minus costs) must be above a minimal level of what
a person feels he deserves.

This level is a standard against

which his satisfaction is Judged and against which other
potential relationships are compared.

The greater the satis-

faction with their relationship, the less likely either person
is to choose another relationship to replace it.

Each person

by
is restrained from breaking or leaving the relationship

barriers and forces imposed upon him by other relationships
and societal norms.

The relationship will be altered or

another
broken if one's expectations are not fulfilled and
outcomes than
relationship is perceived as providing higher

8

the present one.

Thus, a person evaluates a relationship
on

the basis of his previous experience In similar
relationships

and on the basis of other relationships alternatively
available
to him.

Interpersonal relationships are of a progressive natural
those that continue generally become Increasingly Involved
and mutually dependent.

will vary over time.

Thus, It Is assumed that attraction

It will begin at zero when the Individ-

uals first meet and will Increase monotonlcally with time

until some stable level Is achieved by the Interacting
persons (Levlnger, I967).

This level will be reached and

will become relatively stable only after each person has had
the opportunity to experience a broad range of outcomes In

his Interactions with the other person.
The preceding theoretical background provides the basis

for distinguishing among non-formed, forming, and formed
relationships.

In this study non-formed relationships are

referred to as strangers.

When strsingers first meet it is

assumed that their mutual attraction approximates zero.
Iimnedlately they begin to exchange information.

Each explores

the behavior of the other In an attempt to achieve mutually

rewarding outcomes.

As their relationship pi*ogresses, the

outstrangers continue to exchange information and sample
will
If the outcomes are satisfactory, interaction
comes.

may be considered.
continue; if not, an alternative relationship

9

Forming relationships, represented in this study
by
acquaintances, are those in which some involvement is
observed as the individuals reciprocate rewarding behavior.

Each acquaintance Invests himself more fully into the relationship and becomes more dependent upon it.

Each person attempts

to improve the other person's outcomes by lowering that

person's costs in the exchange.

As such behavior is recip-

rocated, greater depth in the relationship is achieved.

Close friends typify formed relationships, those char-

acterized by internally felt attractions and obligations.
Involvement leads to commitment and even greater depth in
the relationship.

Interpersonal trust develops and the

friends exchange personal and confidential Information.

The sampling of alternative relationships is reduced as each
person's investment becomes greater.
This distinction among strangers, acquaintances, and

friends is one of degree.

It is suggested that dyads of

varying degrees of attraction may emit different types of

behavior in a competitive game setting.

More specifically,

friends and acquaintances are expected to be more cooperative
in an experimental game than strangers.

Moreover, friends

expected to be more competitive than acquaintances.
us consider each of these expectations.

Let

The focus will be

affect cooperativeupon differences in degree of liking as they

competitive behavior.

10

Empirical research has consistently shown that
strangers
In a competitive game attempt to maximize their rewards
and

minimize their costs*

Each person obtains for himself the

most favorable outcomes possible.

This Is particularly true

If no further Interaction Is anticipated with the other

participants; with minimal Interpersonal restraints, each

person 1s free to employ a strategy maximizing his outcomes.

For example, numerous studies using the Prisoner’s Dilemma
paradigm have reported greater competition than cooperation

within stranger dyads.

In fact, competitive behavior generally

Increased with time (trials) rather than decreasing.

Further-

more, it has been shown that if one person is always or

unconditionally cooperative in the situation he

vjlll be

exploited even more by the other participants than if he had
been partially or conditionally cooperative (Solomon, i960)*
In other cooperative-competitive situations similar

results have been obtained.

The studies conducted by

Vlnacke and colleagues, discussed in Chapter III> are In
general agreement with the above findings.

In addition, these

studies found males to behave in a consistently exploitative

manner while females were more accommodative In their behavior.
effects
Deutsoh and Krauss' (i960) research dealing with the

further docuof threat upon cooperative-competitive behavior
prevailing strategy
ments these findings. Among strangers, the
to maximize his outcomes
in a trucking game was for each person
large university
Since most of the studies were conducted on
strangers perceived their
campuses. It can be assumed that the

11

relationship with the other participant (a)
as belnc confined
to the experimental situation and,
therefore,
of short

duration.

Each person was relatively Independent of
the
other participants and his behavior was governed
or

controlled

by social and Interpersonal restraints.

Unlike strangers, friends and acquaintances are aware
of, and may be affected by, the duration of their
relationship,

Khowlng that one will continue to Interact with the other

Participant ( 8 ) outside of the experimental situation may

significantly affect his behavior while participating In the
experiment.

His behavior will also be siffected by his previous

associations with the other participant (s )

.

For example, he

may have been In competitive situations with them before and
may remember the outcomes he derived from that experience.

Even If members of the relationship had previously engaged In
few or no competitive situations, there Is still a "pool" of

previous Interpersonal behaviors from other situations upon

which they can draw Inferences applicable to the present
competitive situation.

In other words, a person possesses

expectations about the type of behavior his friend or acquaintance

will exhibit In a situation.

He will structure his behavior

on the basis of these expectations In order to obtain the

highest possible outcomes.
Friends and acquaintances, then, expect to continue their
Interaction following the experimental situation.

Moreover,

more
their past associations should allow them to communicate

.
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freely with one another during the experimental
game.
Positive affect toward others is likely to be
associated

with a high amount of communication; friends communicate
more with friends than with strangers (Back, 1951; Secord &
Backman, 1964),

Klein (1956), too, has shown that in informal

friendship groups the affect structure closely resembles the
communication structure.

Similarly, as a group’s attractive-

ness increases, pressures to communicate also increase
(Festlnger, 1950),

In balance theory terms, when one person

likes another, the liked person will be approached or

contacted, will be benefited or helped, and will be perceived
as benefiting the llker (Heider, 1958)

Thus, the first expectation finds considerable support
in the experimental literature; friends and acquaintances

will be more cooperative than strangers in a competitive
game situation.

The second expectation is less intuitive;

friends are expected to be more competitive than acquaintances
in a laboratory game setting.

Acquaintances, in the process of forming their relationship, are relatively insecure and lack the stability and

security of friends who have been intimately associated with
one another for several years.

Friends, having committed

themselves to their relationship, have developed interpersonal
trust and confidence in their partner.

Because of the devel-

can oppose and
oped nature of their relationship, the friends
situation without
rival one another in a competitive game

endangering their friendship.

However, conflict and

.
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dlsacreement could Jeopardize the forming
relationship of
acquaintances. Even In laboratory game situations,

acquaintances

are expected to avoid conflict and to strive toward
uniformity

and agreement In order to make their relationship more
and overt aggressiveness Is

vei*y

secux*e.

costly while a

relationship Is forming €md must be avoided If possible,
Flather,

the furtherance of the acquaintances* relationship Is

dependent upon the exchange of rewarding behaviors.

Each

person attempts to Improve the other person's outcomes by

lowering that person's costs In the exchange.

Each partner

moves the other through a relatively great number of rewardcost units above the minimal level which that person feels he

deserves (Thlbaut & Kelley, 1959).
Friends, then, can withstand more conflict and strife
than the more tentative relationships of acquaintances.

Friends realize their relationship Is secure and unthreatened
by their competitive behavior.

In spite of Interpersonal

norms which regulate and maintain the relationship, each

friend is permitted to deviate within an acceptable latitude

from the established norms.

Occasionally, even aggressive

behavior which results In lower outcomes Is permitted.
Qamson (1961b), for example, reported that some of the subjects in
his study "preferred to take their chances

vjith a

stranger

rather than to bargain with a 'difficult' fraternity brother"
(p. 400).

Berkowltz (1958) 1 too, suggested that Hieing among

Inhibitions with
group members has the effect of lowering

regard to aggressive behavior

It is suggested that a type of credit
Is created In

formed relationships which allows each to lower
the outcomes
of his partner in certain situations without
threatening

the

cohesiveness of the relationship,
is one such situation.

A competitive game setting

The usual conflicts aroused by a

game are relatively non-costly to the relationship and fall

within the acceptable limits of the partners' credits.

^

To

observer, amd to the friends themselves for that matter,

the amount of conflict displayed at any particular time
diirlng the game may be quite great.

In high cohesiveness both the ability to make demands
and the ability to resist them are greater than in low
cohesiveness. Therefore, a potentiality for conflict
exists in high cohesiveness. This theoretical expectation is borne out by Back’s finding that his
highly cohesive dyads showed not only more strenuous
Influence attempts but also greater overt resistance
to Influence than did his less cohesive dyads
(Thlbaut & Kelley, 1959, PP. 114-115).

While friends are expected to be more competitive than
acquaintances, they are also expected to be more cooperative
than strangers.

Friends continue to interact following the

experiment and are less likely to be as exploitative as
strangers.

Essentially, cooperation and competition are on

a continuum with strangers being the most competitive, then

friends, and

finally’'

acquaintances.

It should also be men-

tioned that the expected competitiveness of friends is reof the
stricted to sltuatlona which do not threaten the existence

relationship.

or the
If the situation is extremely salient

developed
association is threatened with survival, the more

will be the
and intimate the relationship, the greater

15

cooperative behavior.

Roommates and marriage mates, for

example, will cooperate to a high degree when
confronted

with a stressful experience such as bodily Injury,
loss of
valuable possessions, ejb cetera
Acquaintances and dating
.

couples would not be expected to exhibit the same degree
of

cooperative behavior.

But, most competitive situations are

much less severe in their consequences than these.

Certainly,

laboratory game situations are much more moderate In their

demands upon a relationship.

While motivation In real world

conflicts may be very high, this Is generally not the case
In most experimental studies (Qallo & McCllntook, 1965).
A distinction, derived from exchange theory, has been

made among non-formed relationships (strangers), forming

relationships (acquaintances), and formed relationships
(friends).

Differential effects of these varying degrees

of attraction upon behaviors In a competitive setting were

given.

Friends and acquaintances are expected to be more

cooperative In an experimental game than strangers; however,

friends are expected to be more competitive than acquaintances.
Research

The question posed in the Introduction to this chapter

asked If a person would behave differently in a competitive
rather
situation If he were with a friend or an acquaintance

than a stranger.

The theoretical section of this chapter

different
suggested an affirmative answer and discussed

function of the
behaviors which were expected to result as a

16

degree of attraction.

This review Is restricted to relation-

ships In which some Interpersonal Involvement
preceded the
experimental situation. The competitive behavior of
strangers

encountering each other for the first time In a game situation
has already been documented.
In a recent study, McCllntock and McNeel (1967) concluded

that prior dyadic experience, whether hostile or friendly,

was an Important determinant of cooperative-competitive behavior.

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three

pregame conditions:

no prior experience, friendly prior

experience, and hostile prior experience.

Subjects with

friendly prior experience were significantly more cooperative
In a Maximizing Difference Game than those with hostile or

no prior experience.

Prior success or failure has also been

found to Influence subjects* competitive behavior (Harrison &
McCllntock, 1965).

Dyads playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

were significantly more cooperative In their behavior If
they had experienced success Immediately prior to the game
than If they had experienced failure or had no prior experience.

Moreover, dyads who had a one-week delay between their success

or failure experience and the game situation still displayed

more cooperative behavior than dyads with no prior experience.
This was true regardless of whether the prior experience had
been a success or a failure.
of
The preceding experiments Illustrate the effects

behavior.
prior dyadic experiences on cooperative-competitive
prior experiences were
In both of these experiments, however,
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artificially manipulated between stranr.era .

it la doubtful

that their relatlonahlpa could have progreaaed very
far in
their short pregame Interaction. Yet, even this encounter

resulted In greater cooperative behavior.

What effect would

real-life relationships established some time prior to an

experiment have upon the participants* behaviors?
Two studies are particularly relevant to this question.

The first demonstrated that the maintenance of cooperative

behavior In interpersonal situations was affected by an
Interaction between the subject's perception of his partner's

cooperativeness and the preexisting affective relationship
existing between them (Swingle, 1966).

The behavior of an

uncooperative partner resulted In a reduction In a subject's
level of cooperative responding when the partner was either
liked or unknown, but the initial level of cooperativeness

was maintained when the partner was disliked.

Swingle interpreted his findings according to a congrulty

model of social interaction (Pestinger, 1957).

Friends In a

competitive game situation might be expected to maintain or
restore cognitive consistency rather than adopt an optimal
strategy to maximize their Individual payoffs.
"harms** his partner,

When a friend

cognitive Inconsistency exists and the

harmed partner seeks a means for resolving the inconsistency.
change
Friends would be highly resistant to negative attitude

would be sought.
and another means for restoring consonance

harm or retaliate,
The harmed partner could reciprocate the
attitude toward
thereby maintaining the original positive

18

his friend.

The retaliation oould be perceived as horseplay,

fatigue, or some other Innocuous redefinition of his
behavior

which Is not Inconsistent with their friendship.

Retaliation

maintains the Integrity of their relationship by serving as
a dissonance reduction mechanism.
On the other hand, strangers who have neither Interacted

prior to the experiment nor expect to after Its completion
should act In their own self-interests and maximize their

individual payoffs.

Minimal dissonance would result from

retaliating against an unknown person who had been malevolent.
In keeping with the theoretical discussion presented earlier.

Swingle's findings support the notion that both best friends
and strangers will be competitive In an experimental game
situation.

However, the relationships will differ In two

important respects:

(a) friends'

competitiveness will be of

a pseudo nature while strangers' will tend toward a maxi-

mization of self-interest, and (b) friends will maintain
their mutual positive attitudes toward each other v;hile
strangers' attitudes will undergo a negative change.

The second study Is perhaps the most relevant to the

question of the effect of real-life relationships upon game
behavior.

Oskamp and Perlman (19^6) manipulated the degree

of friendship in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

On the basis of

experimental
a sociometric "Questionnaire on Friendship", four

groups were designated

—

best friends, acquaintances, non-

acquaintances or strangers, and disliked Individuals.

Male
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students from Claremont Men's college (business orientation)
and Pomona College (liberal arts orientation) served as
subjects*

A strong positive relationship betvjeen degree of friend-

ship and amount of cooperation was found for Pcmiona subjects*

Claremont subjects^ on the other hand« showed an inverse relationship; best friends were least cooperative by far and
the other groups did not differ from each other.

These results illustrate the complexities of research in
the area of cooperation -competition*

One could interpret the

findings as supporting either a positive or a negative relationship between interpersonal attraction amd cooperative game
behavior*

Perhaps lincontrolled situational variables caused

the discrepant findings*

In a post hoc explanation of the

results, Oskamp and Perlman (1966) suggest that the business

versus liberal arts orientations of the two colleges may be
the best interpretation of the observed differences.

However,

it is questionable whether this interpretation can be general-

ized to other experimental situations which measure cooperative-

competitive behavior*

It is not clear whether friendship

affected the subjects* responses or whether some condition
peculiar to either of the two colleges influenced the observed
behavior*

The preceding research suggests that real-life relationeffect
ships established prior to an experiment do have an
behaviors.
upon the participants' cooperative-competitive

degree of
specific nature of this effect depends upon the

The

.
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attraction among the participants.

Thus, It seems

reasonable to hypothesize that a person's behavior In a

competitive game situation will be affected by his feelings
toward the other partlclpant(s)

I

.

I

<
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CHAPTER III
COALITION FORMATION;
The teiTO coalition

THEORY AND RESEARCH

has had rather broad usage « refer-

ring, at times, to mere Joint participation by

persons*

Thus, either a basketball team or

or more

t>io

businessmen

playing golf might be said to have formed a coalition for

both groups have "a temporary alliance for Joint action"
(Webster, 1956).

Slmmel (1950), in contrasting the dyad

with the triad, discussed how each of three persons could
operate as a mediator between the other two.

Recent writers

(e.g.. Mills, 1953; 195^) have Interpreted Slmmel»s dis-

cussion as suggesting that the most elementary differentiating

tendency of a three-person aiggregate is their segregation
Into a pair and €m other.

According to this interpretation,

a coalition is formed whenever a group Is subdivided Into

subparts.

It Is important to note that the basis for the

subdivision is not specified and presumably changes from

situation to situation, from group to group.

One is currently

made aware of the broad application of the term when he hears
about a coalition government being formed, a coalition between
labor and management ensuring the passage of a law, and so on.

This use tends to emphasize the attainment of some common

goal through coordinated action (Borgatta & Borgatta, 19^3)
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A more restricted definition of coalition la used
in
this study.

The basis upon which subdivisions occur within

a group is that of power or influence.

This assumption leads

to a narrower definition; the term coalition is used to mean

”the Joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a

decision,,," (Qamson, 19^4,

p,

82),

Resources are the raw

materials possessed by each individual in the group.
are often referred to as an individual's power.

These

Experimentally

these resources may be weights, votes, sets of questions and
answers, etc, assigned by the experimenter (E) to the subjects
(^s) prior to the experiment.

If two or more Ss in a group

agree to combine their resources so that their Joint influence
or power changes the outcomes in the situation, they have

formed a coalition.

Individuals form coalitions in order that

their own interests, unattainable by separate action, might
be obtained through Joint action.

more

This may require two or

to cooperate rather than compete so that the outcome

is Improved for all participants in the agreement.

The definition advanced above needs to be further restricted so that the nature of the situations in which

coalitions can be expected to form is more clearly specified.
coalition
It is not meaningful, for example, to speak of

formation in a purely coordinated or cooperative situation.
members are identical
If the interests and powers of all group
the outcomes for
l.e., achieving a solution which maximizes
group to subdivide
all individuals, there is no need for the
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for all would be contributing to the achievement of the
goal.
Similarly, it is not meaningful to speak of coalition formation
in a purely conflicting or competitive situation.

In this

case, an individual cannot enhEince his outcomes any more by

forming a coalition than he can by not forming one.

It is

meaningful, therefore, to speak of coalition formation only

when there are elements of both cooperation and competition
present.

Such a situation has come to be called a mixed-

motive situation.
,,, there is an element of conflict, since there exists
no outcome which maximizes the payoffs to everybody.
There is an element of coordination, since there exists
for at least two of the players the possibility that
they can do better by coordinating their resources
than by acting alone (Gamson, 196^, p. 85).

A coalition, then, is "the Joint use of resources to determine
the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation in-

volving more than two /personqT” (Gamson, 1964,

p, 85).

Theory

Several psychologists and sociologists have attempted
to develop theories of coalition formation.

As a result,

two distinct theories have emerged in the literature to-

gether with a third post hoc explanation.

'Hils

section

theories.
reviews and contrasts the assumptions made by these

their relevant
The research section attempts to summarize

empirical evidence,
a theory
Caplow (1956, 1959) was the first to develop
for the differences
of coalition formation which accounted
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among group members In their power relationships.

Ho de-

sorlbes eight power relationships in which members of a

three-person group might find themselves.

All three members

may be equal in perceived power, one may be stronger than
the other two combined, or one may be perceptibly stronger

than the other two individually but less powerful when the

latter two are allied.

He assumes as a basic premise that

the formation of any coalition depends upon the initial dis-

tribution of power among group members.

Caplow's eight power

relationships systematically vary the initial power of the

group members.

On the basis of the power distribution, he

predicts which two persons are most likely to form a coalition.

Caplow*s theory, then, emphasizes the initial resources which

group members bring to or are assigned to in a particular
situation.

Coalitions are formed on the basis of the per-

ceived strength of the participants; each person manipulates
the position in which he initially finds himself.

The preceding theoretical formulations of Caplow have
been more explicitly stated by damson (I96la, 19^4).

Both

theorists predict identical coalitions in all but one power
relationship.

That relationship, which is of primary concern

in this study, has the following properties;

A^

(B + C).

A

>B

> C,

Caplow predicts that the AC and BC dyads will

BC will
occur equally often, while damson predicts that only

occur.

theory.

Recently, Chertkoff (196?) has revised Caplow's
as
According to his revision, AC will occur half
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frequently as will BC.

An AB coalition Is never expected to

occur.

Differences among these theorists will become
more
prominent during the presentation and discussion of

results.

The Important point to be noted here Is that, for the
power

relationship used In this study, different coalitions are
expected to be formed depending upon one's theoretical position.
All of these theorists, however, emphasize the Initial

distribution of resources.

The position which they represent

Is known as minimum resource theory (Gamson, 196^^).

The

central hypothesis of the theory Is that a coalition will form
in which the total resources are as small as possible while

still being sufficient to control the outcome,

Gamson goes

beyond Cap low and Chertkoff In specifying not only

v/ho

will

coalesce or ally with whom, but also how they will divide the
payoff.

He postulates a parity norm to account for the belief

of group members that an Individual ought to get from an

agreement an amount proportional to what he brought Into It.
"Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition

a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources

which they contribute to a coalition" (Gamson, 1961a,

p.

376 ).

In the language of other theorists the parity norm principle

Is equivalent to Homans*

{196I) principle of distributive

Justice, Thlbaut and Kelley's
level, and Adams'

(

1959 ) definition of comparison

(I965) conceptualization of Inequity.

In

dissummai^, minimum resource theory emphasizes the initial

tribution of resources.

The coalition which forms will have
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total resources as small as possible while
still being able
to control the outcome.
Payoff will be distributed among the

participants of the coalition so that each receives
an amount
proportional to his Initial resources.
A second prominent theory of coalition formation empha-

sizes a rational analysis by the participants of the final outcome of the situation.

This position draws Its strength from

research In the mathematical theory of games (e.g.. Luce &
Ralffa, 1957; Rapoport & Orwant, 19^2; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 196 ^).

In the present discussion It shall be referred

to as minimum power

theoa:*y.

a label provided by Qamson (1964).

The theory suggests that the relative power of the participants may be equal even though their initial resources differ.

Each person possesses pivotal powers the proportion of times
hlB resources can change a losing coalition Into a winning
one.

Thus, power Is defined not In terms of Initial resources

but In terms of the ntimber of "winning” coalitions a person

could form with other persons.

For example, If person A

could be In a winning coalition only If he allied with B,

he has less power than person B who could be In a winning

coalition by allying with A, C, and D.

In this example, B

has a more strategic bargaining position than does A; B's

pivotal power Is three, while A*s is one.

Therefore, according

to minimum power theory. If participants are equal In pivotal

power no one coalition Is more likely to be formed than any
other.

This Is the prediction regardless of the initial
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distribution of resources.

In the power relationship given

>B >C

(B + C), all participants are of

above, A

where

equal pivotal power.
are predicted:

A<

Thus, equal frequencies of coalescing

AB * AC » BC.

Minimum power theoi*y also specifies the manner in which
a winning coalition will divide the payoff it receives.

participant will demand a
power.

shai»e

Each

proportional to his pivotal

Therefore, if allies are equal in pivotal power the

payoff will be divided evenly among them even though their

resources differ.

In summary, minimum power theory emphasizes

a rational approach to the understanding of the outcome of one's

behavior in a competitive situation.

The coalition which

forme will be the one with the smallest total pivotal power

—

a result of the strategic bargaining positions of the participants.

Payoff will be distributed among the participants of

the coalition so that each receives an amount proportional

to his pivotal power.

Both minimum resource theory and minimum power theory

consider power or Influence to be basic to the explanation of
coalition formation.

However, the former conceives of power

among
as residing in the initial distribution of resources
power as the
the participants, while the latter conceives of

achieve a
frequency with which one can use his resources to

profitable outcome.

Both theories predict which coalitions

will divide the
are most likely to form and how the allies
are minimal
payoff among themselves. Such derivations
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requirements of any serious theory of coalition formation.
The baslo conceptual difference between the two theories
Is
in the strategy which group members are expected to pursue.

According to minimum resource theory, a person devises his
strategy according to his initially perceived position in

relation to the other participants.

On the other hand, a

person’s strategy according to minimum power theory is based

upon his rational analysis of the final outcome of the situation.

Mention should also be given to a third explanation of
coalition formation, that of anticompetitive theory .

As

previously stated, this is actually a post hoc theory advanced
by Qamson (196^) and based on an extensive series of experi-

ments performed by Vlnacke and colleeigues.

To the writer's

knowledge, Vlnacke has never conceptualized his results

under the rubric of this theory.

However, he has discussed

at length the anticompetitive strategy which his female

subjects frequently used.

Anticompetitive theory emphasizes the minimization of

disruptive aspects of bargaining.

Participants avoid

dealing

with persons who are highly competitive and skillful in
bargaining.

Coalitions are predicted to fonii between partici-

persons
pants for whom minimal resistance is expected, e.g,,

who are equal in resources or pivotal power.

Gamson (196^)

power
distinguishes this theory from minimum resource and

theories in the following manner;
trying to
If players in minimum power theory are
resource
minimum
in
get as much as they can and players
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trying to get as much as they deserve,
in anticompetitive theory are focused
on maintalning the social relationships in the
group. An
anticompetitive norm exists, the theory suggests,
against efforts to strike the most advantageous
deal
possible. Coalitions will form along the lines
of
least resistance (p. 90),

pliers

The basis for the derivation of anticompetitive
theory
is in Vlnacke's finding that females in his experiments
gen-

erally tried to transform the mixed -motive situation into
a
pure coordination situation.

Vlnacke as "accommodative."

This strategy was labeled by
The participants’ behaviors

wore oriented toward the social relationships of the situation,
"toward the end of arriving at an equitable or ’fair’ out-

come of maximum satisfaction (or at least Justice) to all

concerned" (Bond & Vlnacke, 196I, pp. 71-72),

For example,

rotation systems were devised to equalize the payoffs and,
if permitted, alliances were formed which Included every

participant.

In contrast to the concepts of parity

nom

and

pivotal power discussed earlier, it is suggested that an
equal! zinp; norm accounts for accommodative behavior.

An

equalizing norm asserts that everyone is equal in the situation regardless of his Investments.

Unequal resources and

pivotal powers are threatening to the social cohesiveness of
the group.

Therefore, Inequalities are minimized and pro-

raotlve interdependencies are encouraged.

Vlnacke contrasts accommodative strategy with exploitative
strategy, typically masculine.

Though Qamson (196^) alludes

to this distinction, he neither differentiates exploitative

with
strategy from other strategies nor does he Incorporate it

30

minimum resource or power theories.

If accommodative behavior

is anticompetitive, then exploitative behavior is clearly

competitive.

Participants are strongly oriented toward maxi-

mizing their own share of the rewards and toward obtaining
all that they can for themselves.

It is suggested that

exploitative strategy need not be explained by a fourth
theory.

It clearly 1s not a cooperative orientation (anti-

competitive theory) nor does it seem to be oriented toward

getting what one deserves (minimum resource theory), but is
rather a bargaining orientation designed to get as much as
possible for oneself (minimum power theory).

By definition,

exploitative behavior is not the taking of that to which one
is entitled but the taking of all that one can get.

At

present, then, minimum power theory seems to encompass the

type of strategy which Vinacke called exploitative.

It is

not clear, however, whether or not the strategy implies a

rational analysis of the final outcomes of the situation.
Three theories of coalition formation have been reviewed
and contrasted in this section.

All are similar in that they

are derived from a power or influence base.

their conceptualization of this base.

They differ in

For one theory the

power reinitial distribution of resources determines the

which these
lationships, for another theory the frequency with
pivotal power)
resources can be put to profitable use (l.e.,
theory the
determines the power structiire, and for a third

members
interpersonal social relationships of the gTOup
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estabUahes a norm determlnlns alllanoes.

New evidence for

these theories will be presented In Chapter
V and discussed
in Chapter VI.

Hesearoh

Several different types of mixed -motive situations
have
t

t

been employed in the Investigation of coalition formation
variables:
ft

competitive board games similar to Parchesl (Amldjaja

Vlnaoke, I965J Bond

Kelley

ft

Vinacke, 196I; Chaney

Arrowood, I960; Stryker

ft

1959; Vlnaoke, 196i*b; Vlnacke

Dlen,

ft

Ragusa,

Young, 19665 Vlnacke
ft

Crowell,

Psathas, 196O; Vlnacke,

ft

Qulllckson, 1964; Vlnacke,

196^5 Willis,

Vlnacke, 1963; Vlnacke, Ragusa,

Vlnacke, 196O;

Arkoff, 1957; Vlnacke, Crowell,

ft

ft

ft

1962), quiz games (Uesugl
ft

Crowell, 1964; Vlnacke

ft

ft

Stanley, I962), multiplication and matching games (Vlnacke,
1964a), a political convention game (Burris

ft

Frye, 19665

Qamson, 1961b), and a payoff matrix game (Lleberman, 1962).

The competitive board game is illustrative of a typical

experimental situation.

Each S is randomly assigned a given
These resources are

amount of resources prior to each game.
often in the form of weights, l.e.,

4,

3,

2,

or

1.

During

the game all players move simultaneous ly each time a die is
thrown, moving the distance equal to their weights times the

value of the die.

The game is terminated when one player or

a combination of players reaches ’‘home” or the players agree

on who is the winner.

Clearly, the larger the amount of a

person's (or team's) resources the greater is the probability
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of winning the game*

At any time during the gEune any player

may form a coalition with any other player,

in this event,

the partners or allies pool their resources and play the
re-

mainder of the game according to their combined resources
times the value of the die thrown.

Once a coalition is

formed in a particular game and a division of the payoff decided upon, the agreement is considered permanent for that game.

Studies of coalition formation have dealt predominately

with three-person groups, although four-person g3x>ups (Willis,
1962) and five-person groups (Oamson, 1961b) are represented
in the literature.

Attention has been focused on the types

of strategy associated with various distributions of resources

among players, situational factors, and group composition.

More specifically, independent variables manipulated have been:
amount and distribution of resources (e.g,, 3-2-2, 4-3-2,
4-2-1, 1-1-1,

••.)>

(same-sex, mixed-sex), experimental

games (board vs. quiz, multiplication vs. matching), incentive

conditions (game -by -game, cumulative score, delayed payoff,

immediate payoff), ages (7-8* l4-l6, college), motivations
(achievement, nurturance), information concerning strategies
(1,
(6j^,

2,

or 3 members informed), emd values of payoff matrix
It should be noted that variables of an inter-

8^, 10^).

personal nature, such as attraction, have not been systematically manipulated.

Dependent variables have been, for the

proportion of paymost part, frequency of coalitions formed,
and reception
off agreed upon or"deals made," and initiation
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of offers to ally

—

bargaining behavior.

Several general conclusions from the preceding research
are relevant to the present study.

Some ooncluslona result

from consistent findings of numerous studies, while others
remain more tenuous.

Vinacke and colleagues have repeatedly

found that the two players of a triad possessing the least
amount of resources form a coalition agad.nst the third player

who possesses the greatest amount of resources.

However, the

coalitions were primarily formed when it was possible for the
two "wealcer” members to win by allying (e.g,, 3-2-2, 4-3-2).

Few coalitions were formed when one member possessed a majority of the resources or was all-powerful (e.g., 3-1-1# 4-2-1).
‘’The

weakest member of the triad Is in the most favored position

when it comes to Joining pair coalitions” (Kelley & Arrowood,
i960, p. 243).

These results wei*e supportive of minimum

resource theory (Caplow, 195^# 1959# Chertkoff, 19^7# damson,
1961a, 1964).

The findings indicated that outcomes were de-

termined by the players' perceptions of their relative strengths
at the outset of a game.

Initiation of offers to

allj^

generally

conformed to the distribution of resources at the beginning
of the game.

Players who perceived themselves as weak initiated

not peroffers to ally significantly more often than players

ceiving themselves as weak.

The players also demanded a

of resources
share of the payoff proportional to the amount

which they had contributed to the coalition

(Oainson,

1961b).

3^

The strong empirical evidence for minimum
resource theory
was evidence against minimum power theory. Where
resources

were distributed In a 3-2-2 or ^-3-2 fashion, a rational

analysis of the situation should have led the participants
to conclude that each player, In terms of final outcome, was

equal to the other two.

Few,

If any, experiments demonstrated

that such a rational analysis was operative during the coali-

tion situation.

Kelley and Arrowood (i960) criticized the

complex procedure used by Vlnacke and Arkoff

hypothesized

'’that

(

They

1957 ).

with a simpler procedure, subjects will

acquire an adequate understanding of the true power relations
and act more In accord with a rational analysis of the situation than the Vlnacke and Arkoff data would suggest" (Kelley &

Arrowood, i960,

p.

233 ).

Their results were interpreted as

supportive of their hypothesis.

Coalitions were formed more

in keeping with a chance distribution than were those

in Vlnacke and Arkoff 's experiment.

fomed

However, the frequency

distribution remained favorable to minimum resource theory.
Perhaps the most important finding was that the greater the

number of games played with the same resource distributions,
the more coalitions formed on the basis of chance.

That Is,

players learned very rapidly that their powers were equal and

conformed in later games to the expectations of minimum power
theory.

Recently, a more direct test of the two theories was

made (Vinacke, Crowell, Dien, & Young, 19^ 6 ).

It was con-

extended learning
cluded that even though groups were given an
were informed
session and one to three players of each group
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about boi^ strategies, ’’there was little evidence for
a signi-

ficant shift to an equal Incidence of the three possible

coalitions (l,e«, weak alliances continued to occur at a
level above-chance under the Information conditions).”

The

overall evidence at this time Is more supportive of minimum
resource theory than of minimum power theory.
A third Interpretation of coalition formation discussed

earlier Is anticompetitive theory.

The foremost concern Is

with the social relationships among group members.
effects upon the group are minimized.

Disruptive

In contrast to an

exploitative strategy In which males are oriented toward

winning and strong competitiveness, an accommodative or antlcompetlve strategy, typical of females. Is characterized by

mutually satisfactory arrangements or equitable outcomes
oriented toward the social situation Itself.

More specifically,

females (a) more often fall to form coalitions, (b) arrive at

more triple alliances, (c) form more coalitions when none are
necessary, and (d) agree upon more proportionate divisions of
the payoff (Vinacke, 1959)

.

A comparison of three experimental

games (competitive board, masculine quiz, feminine quiz) re-

sulted In additional evidence for accommodative and exploitative

strategies (Vinacke, Ragusa, & Crowell, 196^).

Furthermore,

differences among the experimental games did not alter the
&
nature of the strategy followed by the sexes (Vinacke

Stanley, I962).

Nor was the strategy changed when mixed-sex

& Vinacke,
triads were substituted for same-sex triads (Bond
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1961 ).

Even with four Incentive conditions Introduced
into
the situation, Vlnacke (1962) concluded that
'*the most striking behavior was associated with differences between
exploitative (masculine) and accommodative (feminine) strategy.”

At

the present time, only one study has reported finding no
sig-

nificant differences between male and female behavior (Burris

& Prye, 1966),

It Is concluded, therefore, that the sexes

manifest striking contrasts In their styles of play, l.e.,
in the kinds of coalitions they form and In the payoff they

agree upon.
Of less relevance to the present study are the effects

of differences In age (Vinacke & Oulllckson, 1964 ) and moti-

vational levels (Chaney & Vlnacke, 196O; Amidjaja & Vlnacke,
1965) on coalescing behavior.

There Is some evidence for a

developmental change In competitive behavior among males
between the ages of 7-8 and l 4 -l6 years.

Both males and

females display accommodative behavior during younger ages,
but males shift from accommodative to exploitative behavior

during the early teen-age years.

Motivational differences

have also been found among males, but not among females.

Males high In achievement play an active, initiating role in
coalition formation; those high In nurturance play a less
active, recipient role.

Thus, motivational differences are

Important for the frequency with which males assert themselves
In the bargaining aspects of the experimental game.
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Hypotheses

The conceptual hypothesis guiding this study Is that

dyads of attracted relationships will be more cooperative

when placed Into a mixed-motive situation than will stranger
dyads of

unattracted relationships, but that friend dyads

will be more competitive than acquaintance dyads.
Specific hypotheses of this study are stated according
to the two major Independent variables:

attraction and sex.

Predictions for both attraction and sex are made for each of
the three major dependent variables:

frequency of coalitions

formed. Initiators and recipients of offers to ally, and

agreed upon divisions of payoff.

Frequency of Coalitions Formed
Acquaintance dyads will form coalitions
Attraction
more frequently than will friend dyads, and both
attracted dyads will coalesce more frequently than
will stranger control dyads.
,

Sex . Male groups will form coalitions more frequently
than will female groups.

Initiators and Recipients of Offers to Ally
Attraction. Acquaintance dyads will initiate and
receive offers to ally more frequently than will
friend dyads, and both attracted dyads will initiate
and receive offers more frequently than will
stranger control dyads.
to
Male groups will Initiate and receive offers
groups.
more frequently than will female

Dlvislona of Payoff
Attraction.

Acquaintance dyads will agree upon
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more proportionate dlvlBlons of payoff than will
friend dyads, and both attracted dyads will agree
upon more proportionate divisions than will
stranger control dyads.
Sex , Male groups will agree upon less proportionate
divisions of payoffs than will female groups.
/

*v

I

CHAPTER

IV

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Sub.lects

One hundred and eighty undergraduate students at the

University of Massachusetts participated In the experiment,
Ss were assigned to 60 groups, 30 composed of males and 30

of females.

Design
The experimental design was a two-between and one-wlthln

analysis of variance; the between-group variables were attraction
and sex; the withln-group variable was resources assigned
across twelve experimental games.
of attraction were manipulated:

and friends.

For each sex, three levels
strangers, acqualntemces,

Thus, there were six experimental conditions of

ten triads each.

Stranger groups were composed of three randomly selected
The only restriction was that they had

same-sex students.

not chosen each other- on a "Student Questionnaire" to be

explained below.

Acquaintance and friend groups were com-

posed of two acquaintances, or of two friends, and a stranger.
In all groups, attracted dyads had Indicated reciprocal

soclonetrlc choices.

A stranger was randomly assigned as

the third person for each attracted dyad, with the restrictions

th&t h© b© of th©

dyad

meiiiber

saine

sex and bhab h© had chosen neither

nor had been chosen by them.

During the first week of the Spring semester, 1966, a
”Student Questionnaire" (see Appendix) was administered to

all students in two different undergraduate psychology
classes.

From this pool of approximately 590 Ss, 20 acquaint-

ance dyads were selected (10 male, 10 female) and 20 friend
dyads.

Acquaintance dyads were mutual choices of persons

who were "just beginning to associate with each other and who
hoped to become better acquainted."

Friend dyads were mutual

choices of "roommates, sorority sisters, fraternity brothers,
etc., who had known each other for one year or longer and

who frequently participated In social situations together,"
Roommates were selected whenever possible,
A post-experimental measure of these manipulations was
taken.

Six groups were replaced because of changes In re-

lationships occurring during the two-month Interval between
Ss*

sociometric choices and the experimental situation; either

an attracted dyad member and the stranger had begun to form
a relationship, or the degree of attraction between dyad

members had changed.
Dependent variables were frequency of coalitions formed.
agreed
Initiators and recipients of offers to ally, and

upon divisions of payoff.

Experimental Qame
A simple Intra -group competitive board game
was used.
A board was constructed, similar to one used by
Vlnacke and
In games like Parchesl, with 103 spaces, the last
space being

the "goal,"

Every fifth space was numbered.

The objective

of the game was to be the first to move from "start" to
"goal,"

B >

C,

of

The power relationship used was one In which A
>

where

A<

3 and 2.

(B + C).

Resources were assigned weights

After every throw of a single die by

^

each

player moved a number of spaces equal to his assigned weight
times the number of pips shown on the die.

Therefore, If

the value of the die was 5» one player advanced 20 spaces,
the second 15 spapes, and the third 10 spaces.

moved simultaneously.

All players

After the first throw of a game, any

player could offer to ally with any other player.

If the

offer were turned down or an agreement could not be reached
concerning the division of the payoff, the game continued with
each S playing Independently.

Further offers by any player

could be made during the course of the game.

Hov;ever,

if an

offer were accepted and the players agreed on the division
of a 100 point payoff, they pooled their resources and pro-

ceeded to a position on the board equal to their combined
spaces.

For the remainder of the game the allies moved forward

according to their combined resources times the throw of the
die.

game,

Once an alliance was formed. It was permanent for that
his
A player was permitted to concede defeat whenever

^2

position appeared hopeless.

Each game terminated, then,

either when one player or a coalition of players reached the
"goal," or when the group agreed upon a winner (s).

Procedure and Instructions
were seated randomly In one of three semi-circle
positions around the game board,
Ss.

E was directly opposite the

A stand on the table In front of each

contained a

signal button and an upright Information plaque.

The button

was depressed by S whenever he wished to bargain with another
player.

This signal activated one of three lights on E’s

control panel enabling E to keep an accurate record of
Initiators and recipients and to determine which S initiated
first In the event of nearly simultaneous signals.

The

plaque was mounted on the front of the stand shielding each
S^*s

hand from view of the other players.

front of the plaques were Ss' first names.

Attached to the
A clip on the top

of the plaque held each player's assigned weight for a parti-

cular game.

The Information of each plaque was clearly

visible to all Ss.
Prior to each of 12 games, E assigned weights of
and 2 to the players.

3>

Ten random sequences were generated,

condition.
one for each of the 10 groups In an experimental

procedure so
A restriction was placed upon the randomization
times during the
that all players received each weight four
dyad was
course of the experiment. Thus, each attracted
resource combinations
assigned equally often to the three basic

^3

^-3, ^-2, and 3-2.

SB were Instructed that E would keep a
cumulative score
during the series of g£unes and that the results
would be an-

nounced at the conclusion of the experiment.

Ss did not know

how many games were to be played; this was to minimize
attempts
to ’’speculate" on the weight assignments and to reduce
the

possibility of mutual agreements regarding future games.
The purpose of the cumulative score was motivational.

It

provided an Incentive ^ for evei^ 100 points accumulated

during the experiment was worth 25 cents.

Thus, $3.00 was

divided among the members of each group.
The following Instructions were read to every group;

each player was given a copy to read and consult during the

games If needed.

.

This game Is a contest between three players. The
objective Is to reach the "goal" first. Before every
game each pleiyer will be assigned a number representing
his strength for that game. You will move by multiplying your assigned number times the value of a die,
thrown by the experimenter. For example. If you are
assigned a number of "2" and the die comes up "3">
you will move six spaces on the game board, 100 points
will be given to the winner or winners of each game.
At the end of the experiment the points from all games
will be totaled. Each player will receive in cash 1
cent for every k points that he accumulates^ *Jhus, 20
points are worth 5^, 100 points 2^, etc.

After the die hits the table on the first throw of
a game, any player may foi*m an alliance with any other
In this event, players entering Into alliance
player.
must decide upon how they will divide the 100 points.
If a player wins by himself he receives all 100 points.
If he Is a member of a winning alliance, he divides the
100 points with his ally. After forming an alliance,
players join forces and proceed to the position on the
board represented by their combined acquired spaces;
thereafter, they move according to their combined

assigned numbers. In other words^ the two players
Join as If they were one player, with one position on
the board and one combined number. Once an alliance
Is formed. It Is permanent for that game and that game
only. Triple alliances are not allowed.
To form an alliance, a player signals the experimenter
by pressing the button In front of him. He then names
the player with whom he wishes to talk. These two
players have a maximum of 1^ minute to decide If they
want to ally, and how they are going to divide the 100
points between them. If either desires to explore the
possibility of forming an alliance with the third
player, he may terminate the discussion he Is having
by pressing his button and naming the other player.
The player not Included In a discussion is not allowed
to Interrupt during the 1 minute time limit. However,
he may Initiate an alliance If the other players reach
a stalemate In their discussion or If the discussion
time runs out.
Any player may concede defeat If he (she) considers
his (her) position to be hopeless at any point during
any game.

After these instructions were read, E Illustrated the game
In the following manner.

Okay, let me show you an example of how the game Is
If there are any questions, please feel free
played.
to ask them. First, everyone place their markers on
"start.” The numbers that will be assigned during
the experiment are 4, 3> s-nd 2. Let's say, for example,
Blue Is 3, and Yellow Is 2. I throw the
that Red Is
Each player moves by multidie and It comes up .
plying his number times the number of pips on the die.
Blue (3) to
,
In this case Red (4) would move to
It
and
again
die
the
throw
I
to
Yellow
.
and
(2)
(markers moved a second time) The
comes up
.
same procedure Is followed for each throw of the die.
.

.

they
Now, if Red and Blue should form an alliance,
.
would add their spaces together, which would be
and
Blue
li*
is
7.
number
From then on their combined
Yellow formed an alliance they would advance to of
n^er
and play from then on with the combined alliance they
an
formed
Similarly, If Red and Yellow
and play from
would advance to
is
If an alliance is formed it Is
oTT,
number
combined
however.
game,
permanent for that game. In the next

,

^5

everyone begins again from start
over from g€Lme to game.

—

no alliances carry

An alliance may be initiated by any player after the
die has hit the table on the first throw of a game, A
player simply presses his button to signal me that he
wishes to discuss a possible alliance with another
player.
If these two players decide to ally, they
must decide how they are going to divide the 100
points.
If they decide not to ally or an agreement
i*eached, either one may signal to talk with
the third player if he so desires. Although he is
not allowed to Interrupt, the third player may initiate
an alliance if the other two do not come to an agreement in 1 minute

Each game has 100 points to be given to the' winner
or winners. The points won by each player will be
totaled at the end of the experiment. Each will receive in cash 1 cent for every four points that he
accumulates,
,

E asked if there were any questions and paraphrased the

appropriate instruction if any were asked.

Weights for the
*

i

first game were assigned and an explanation given of how to

display them on the plaque.

The first game was begun.

CHAPTER

V

RESULTS

The results of this study are presented In three sections

according to the dependent variables;

frequency of coalitions

formed. Initiators and recipients of offers to ally, and

divisions of payoff.

Within each section findings relevant

to the attraction and sex hypotheses are given as well as

data supportive" of the coalition theories.

It should be

noted that data within each section are first presented for
groups, then for dyads.

Frequency of Coalitions Formed
The results reported in this chapter are generally

based on coalitions actually formed.

There were 720 possible

coalitions (60 groups times 12 games each).
games no coalitions were formed.

However, In 52

Thus the analyses were

performed upon 668 coalitions; the mean number of coalitions
per group was 11.13.
coalescing
Scores for each group were the frequencies of
't-S. ^-2, and
In the three possible resource combinations:
formed by groups and by
3-2. Mean frequency of coalitions
The first cell
resource combinations Is given In Table 1.
number of times the 20
of this table represents the mean

U-3 coalitions.
groups including friend dyads formed

^7

TABI£ 1
Mean Frequency of Coalitions Formed by

Groups and by Resource Combinations

Resource Combinations

Groups

Group

^-3

4-2

3-2

Means

Friends

3.85

3.20

4.30

3.78

Acquaintances

2.30

4.15

4.55

3.67

Strangers

2.45

3.00

5.60

3.68

Resource Means

2.87

3.45

4.82

3.71

TABLE 2
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Groups of Coalitions
Formed by Sex» Attraction « and Resources

Source

SS

df

MS

P

Between Groups
6.11*

6.42

1

6.42

Attraction (A)

.24

2

.24

S X A

.68

2

.34

56.73

54

1.05

120.21

2

60.11

10.23

2

A X R

4.74
62.89

4

2.37
15.72

2.67

S X A X R

41.96

4

10.49

1.78

634.87

108

5.86

Sex (S)

0/SA

Within Groups
Resources (R)
S X R

GR/SA

*P<
**P<

.05
.01

M

.
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If groups In all experimental conditions had
formed all

resource combinations equally often, each cell mean would
be
3»71^ l,e., one-third of the 11,13 coalitions formed per

group.

Table 2 Is a summary of the analysis of variance for

groups

The main effect of Attraction was not significant and
simply shows that coalitions, regardless of the resource
combinations, were formed equally often In all groups.

It Is

not a test of varying degrees of dyadic attraction, for each

group not only Includes the frequency of attracted dyad
coalitions, but also those coalitions formed between members
of the dyad and the stranger.

was significant (P

=*

The main effect of Resources

p<

10.23, df 2/l08,

.01),

Coalitions

were formed as predicted by minimum resource theory:
4-2 > 4-3,

3-2 >

A significant Attraction by Resource Interaction

was also obtained (F « 2.67, df 4/108,

p<

.05).

V/hen

all

members of the group were strangers, the preponderance of
coalitions were of a 3-2 nature.

In groups where two of the

three participants had prior dyadic experience, the Incidence
of 3-2 alliances was much less frequent.

Groups including

friends formed a large number of 4-3 coalitions, while those
4-2
Including acquaintances allied very frequently In the

combination.

The latter finding suggests that acquaintance

gains.
groups were oriented toward maximizing their Individual
for acquaintLater In this section, the frequency of coalescing

ance dyads alone will be presented.

Will these dyads. In fact,

be more competitive than friend dyads?

i*9

Table 2 also shows a significant main effect of Sex
(P

=«

6,11, df 1/54,

p<

.05).

As predicted, the mean frequency

of coalition formation for Males (3.90) differed significantly

from the mean frequency for Females (3.52).

Of the 52 games

In which no coalitions were formed, ^3

were In female

groups.

(835^)

Seventeen of the 30 female groups

form a coalition during one or more games.

(575^)

failed to

However, only 8

male groups (27^) failed to coalesce during every game, with
7 of the 8 forming no alliances during Just one of the 12

games.

It was noted earlier that non-coalescing Is considered

one form of accommodative behavior.

As In previous research,

females allied less frequently than did males.

The nonsigni-

ficant interactions with sex reveal that the behavior of

males and females did not differ in the various attraction
and resource conditions.

Their behavior differed only In

the frequency of their coalescing.
As an additional test of minimum power and minimum

resource theories, an analysis was performed on the frequency

with which each resource combination was fomed across the
twelve games.

The analysis Included all coalitions formed on

a particular game.

If, as Kelley and Arrowood (i960) sug-

power
gested, subjects acquire an understanding of the true
game,
relations with repeated experience In the experimental
approximate
then the frequency of coalition formation should

games are played.
a chance distribution as more and more
there was not a
From the first through the twelfth game
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significant change In the frequency of occurrence of the
three possible coalitions (P * 1,17).

However, there was a

trend toward a more rational analysis of the situation as

predicted by minimum power theory.

Figure 1 plots percentage

of coalitions formed for each resource combination against

four blocks of three games each.
on coalitions actually formed.

Percentages are based only

The percentage of 3-2 alliances

was particularly high during the first block of games.

Across

games, 4-2 alliances Increased until their occurrence was

Identical with 3-2 coalitions during the last block of games.
Finally, the frequency of 4-3 coalitions remained relatively

stable throughout the entire sequence of games.

Repeated

experience with the same weight assignments (4-3-2) resulted
In a trend toward a more chance distribution of alliances.

Thus, some support was obtained for Kelley and Arrowood's
(i960) finding "that after the first three or four trials

there Is little more than chance exclusion of 4 from coalitions."

Table 3 presents the mean frequency of obtained and

expected coalitions formed by dyads and by resource combinations.
The means of this table are based only on friend dyads, acquaintof
ance dyads, or stranger control dyads; that Is, on Just one

the three possible dyads represented In the group analyses.
players
The stranger dyads were one randomly selected pair of

from each group of three strangers.

Scores are contingent

resource combinaon both the degree of dyadic attraction and
coalitions given
Thus, the mean frequency of obtained
tion.

FORMED

COALITIONS

OF

PERCENTAGE

Figure

1*

Percentage of coalitions formed by

groups for each resource combination across blocks
of games.
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TABLE 3
Mean Frequency of Obtained (and Expected) Coalitions

Formed by I^ade and by Resource Combinations

Resource Combinations

Dyads

Friends

4-2
1.60
(1.28)

>

Acquaintances

.85
.

(

.80
.82)

Strangers

Resource Means

77 )

(

3-2

Dyad
Means

2.00

1;75

1.65
( 1 . 07 )

(l.'tS)

1.15
(1.38)

(

.85
(

1.08

;

98 )

1.22

ll 55
^
1 . 52 )

1.18

1.90
(1.85)

1.18

1.82

1.37

TABLE 4
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Dyads of Coalitions

Formed by Sex, Attraction, and Resources

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between Dyads
.14

1

.14

Attraction (A)
S X A

12.84

2

6.42

.18

2

.09

D/SA

46.23

5^

.86

18.31

2

9.16

7.34

2

1.36

1.09

A X R

2.71
3.96

4

.99

S X A X R

3.02

4

.76

134.67

108

1.25

Sex (S)

Within Dyads
Resources (R)
S X R

DR/SA

**p<

.01

7.50**

•
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In the first cell of Table 3 (l.6o) represents the
mean

frequency of Friend -Friend alliances when ^-3 coalitions

were actually formed.

Mean frequencies of expected coalitions,

given In parentheses, were derived from the group data of
Table 1.

For example, for friend groups which coalesced

an average of 3.85 times In the ^-3 resource combination. It

may be assumed that the two friends allied one-third of the
time and that each friend allied with the stranger one-third
of the time.

The expected frequency of an alliance between

any pair, then. Is 3*85 divided by 3 or 1,28,

In Table 3,

contrasts can be made between obtained mean frequencies and

expected mean frequencies for all dyads.

It should be noted

that friend dyads consistently formed more coalitions than

expected while the alliances of acquaintance and stranger
dyads did not differ from the expected frequencies.

Table 4

summarizes the analysis of variances for coalitions formed
by dyads.

Dyads of varying attraction differed significantly In
their frequency of allying (F « 7.50, df 2/54,

p<

.01),

Friend dyads allied more frequently than acquaintance or
stranger dyads regardless of the resources assigned to them.
Moreover, acquaintances and strangers did not differ from

each other In their overall mean frequency of allying.

The

is seen
effect of dyadic attraction upon coalitions formed
of coalitions
more distinctly In Figure 2; mean frequency
As predicted
formed Is plotted against resource combinations.

5^

FORMED

COALITIONS

OF

FREQUENCY

MEAN

RESOURCE

Figure

2.

COMBINATIONS

Mean frequency of dyad formation

when dyad possessed resource combinations of ^-3^
4-2, and 3-2.
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friend dyads formed more coalitions than stranger control
dyads.

However, contrary to expectations, acquaintance

dyads did not coalesce more frequently than friend or

stranger control dyads.

Thus, the attraction hypothesis was

only partially supported.

The predicted rivalry between

friends as opposed to cooperation between acquaintances was
not found.

Rather, friend dyads played to maximize their

Joint outcomes while acquaintance and stranger dyads generally

played to maximize their Individual outcomes.

Therefore, the

previous question Is answered In the affirmative:

acquaintance

dyads were more competitive than friend dyads.

Table h also shows that frequency of coalition formation
was a function of the Resources assigned to the dyads (P
7.34, df 2/108,

p<

.01).

=»

The 3-2 resource combination led

significantly more often to a coalition than did the 4-2 or
4-3 combinations.

The mean frequencies plotted In Figure 2

also show that for all dyads, 3-2 was more frequently formed
than 4-2 or 4-3.

This finding again supports a minimum

resource Interpretation cf coalition formation.

Coalitions

small as
were formed In which the dyads* resources were as
the outcome.
possible while still being sufficient to control

all groups and
Although the trend was for 3-2 > 4-2 > 4-3 In

prominent for strangers.
dyads, differences were particularly
attracted groups and
Resource combinations differed less for
equally In all reIn fact, friends coalesced almost
dyads.
groups or dyads were
source combinations. Therefore, whether
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considered, the effect of prior dyadic experience was
to decrease the frequency of coalitions formed according to
a

minimum resource strategy.

The greater the degree of attraction,

the less minimum resource theory predicted coalescing behavior.

Initiators and Recipients of Offers to Ally

The analyses In this section will only be concerned with

successful initiations of offers to ally.

Only 7.55^ of

first Initiation offers were unsuccessful; 9 , 0 % of all offers

were unsuccessful,

5.85^ by

unsuccessful attempts to

males and

allj^

3.2$^

by females.

Thus,

were very Infrequent.

Scores for each group were frequencies of Initiating or

receiving offers to ally by the three resource assignments:
4,

3^

and 2,

Mean frequency of offers Initiated and received

by groups and by resource assignments Is given In Table 5.

The first cell of this table represents the mean number of
times the 20 groups Including friend dyads Initiated offers

when assigned a resource of

M.

It should be noted that the

group means are Identical with those of Table

1.

Since only

successful Initiation attempts were analyzed, all successful
Initiations, by definition, resulted in coalitions.

It is

variance
f u rther* noted that In the summary of the analysis of
same
presented In Table 6, the between-groups effects are the
as those In Table 2.

Again, offers to ally were initiated

and received equally often In all groups.

And, as before,

successful offers
males were the Initiators and recipients of
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TABLE 5

Mean Frequency of Initiators and Recipients
by Groups and by Resource Assignments

43

432

Initiators

Groups

Recipients

2

Group
Means

Friends

3.65

4.15

3.55

3.30

4.10

3.95

3.78

Acquaintances

3.75

2.80

4.45

2.70

4.05

4.25

3.67

Strangers

3.85

3.75

3.45

1.60

4.35

5.10

3.68

Resource Means

3.75

3.57

3.82

2.53

4.17

4.43

3.71

.

TABLE 6
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Groups for Initiators
and Recipients by Sex, Attraction, and Resources
Recipient

Initiator
df

Source

MS

F

MS

P

Between Groups
6.11*

6.42

6.11*

Sex (S)

1

6.42

Attraction (A)

2

.24

• OJ

S X A

2

.34

.34

54

1.05

1.05

Resources (R)

2

1.01

63.49

8.53**

S X R

2

8.61

1.56

19.29

2.59

A X R
S X A X R
GR/SA

4

7.82

1.42

1.50

4

.47

108

5.52

11.13
9.18
7.44

G/SA
Within Groups

1.

*P<
**p<

.05
.01

1

1.23
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to ally significantly more often than
were females.

As Initiators

and 2 did not differ significantly

3#

,

in the frequency with which they offered to
form coalitions.

Minimum power theory predicts that all players should
Initiate
with equal frequency since all players are equal In pivotal
power.

However, support for this theory must be qualified.

Although ^ Initiated offers to ally as frequently as
3 and 2
In all games,

initiated only 21% of the alliances during

the first three games,

the second and third blocks of

games 4 was Initiating slightly above a chance level (36%),

and by the final three games 4's percentage had risen above
chance to 4l%.

Thus, a significant change was found across

games In the frequency of Initiations by 4, 3, and 2 (F «
2.75> df 11/543,

p<

As a greater number of games were

.01).

played, 4 Increased his Initiation offers while 2's decreased.

The data showed that support for minimum power theory was not

obtained until approximately the fifth game.

During the first

block of games, players with the smallest assigned weights

were the most frequent Initiators as expected by minimum
resource theorists.
Table 6 also shows that recipients of offers to ally

differed significantly (P

«*

8.53> df 2/108,

p<

.01).

The

player assigned a weight of 2 received more Initiation offers
than those assigned weights of 3 or 4.

There was also a

nonsignificant trend for 2 to receive more offers as games
progressed (P - 1.57).

It was noted above, however, that 2
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Initiated less frequently across games.

Therefore, his

Increased frequency as a recipient over games must be
interpreted viith caution.

Minimum povter theoi^y predicts that the

possessor of each resource assignment should receive an equal

number of offers to ally since each can equally change a
losing coalition into a winning one.

On the other hand,

minimum resource theory predicts that in order to maximize
his payoff, a player should possess resources in excess of
his ally *8,

The greater his resources relative to his ally*s,

the greater the share of the payoff he can demand according
to the parity norm.

Therefore, the player possessing a

resource of 2 should be the recipient of the most offers,
as he was in the above findings.

He not only changes a

losing coalition into a winning one, but may also provide
the initiator with the greater proportion of the payoff.

The exchange between initiator and recipient can be

examined according to the resources assigned to each.

For

example, when 3 initiated, was his offer more frequently made
to

-4

or to 2?

According to minimum power theory, it is ex-

pected that ^ and 2 will each receive one-half of 3's initiations.
However, this was not the case as shown in Table 7.

total percentage of offers initiated by 3 was .32:
and .21 to 2 (F « 10.39> df 1/54,

P<

.01),

The
.11 to 4

Initiations

from 2 to 3 occurred significantly more frequently than from
2 to 4 (F * 12,94, df 1/54,

P<

.01).

Finally, Initiations

from 4 to 2 were more frequent than from 4 to

3,

but the
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difference only approached etatlstlcal slenlflcance
(p 2*89, df 1 /5^, ,10 >p.)> 05 ). Thus, the data clearly

Indi-

,

cate a preference for an alliance with a player who
possessed
a smaller resource than one’s own, or, in the case of
2 , with

a player most nearly like oneself.

TABLE 7

Percentage of Offers to Ally for Groups from Initiator
to Recipient by Resource Assignments

432
Recipient

Initiator

Total

.15

.19

.3^

3

.11

- -

.21

.32

2

.12

.22

-

-

.3^

.23

.37

.to

1.00

Total

Flgoire 3 shows percentage of offers to ally from Initiator

to recipient across blocks of games.

Segments of the figure

from left to right are initiations by

4,

3 , and 2.

It can

be seen that the increase of 4*s initiations across games

were directed to 2, not to

3.

Conversely, 2*s increased

frequency of receiving offers was primarily due to 4's more
frequent initiations; 3 not only received fewer offers, but
continued to initiate at a relatively stable frequency.
Table 8 presents the mean frequency of obtained and exassignments.
pected offers to ally by dyads and by resource

6l

from

GAMES
groups

by
games.

ally

THREE

tc

offers

of

blocks

OF
of
across

Percentage

BLOCKS
recipient

3.
to

Figure

initiator

AllV 01 Sy3dJ0 30

39VlN30H3d

(
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TABUE 8

Mean Frequency of Obtained (and Expected)
Initiators and
Recipients by Pyads and by Resource Assignments

^32

Initiators

Recipients

T^rn/1 a

4

Friends

2

3

1

I^ad

Means

1.65 1.85 1,75 1.60 1.75 1.90
(1.22) (1.38) (i.is; ( 1 . 10 )( 1 . 37 )( 1 . 32 )

Acquaintances

1.15 1.00 1.40
1 . 25 ) ( . 93 ) 1 . 48
.95 1.55 1.05
( 1 . 28 )( 1 . 25 )( 1 . 15

(

Strangers

Resource Means

1.25

1.47

l.^K)

;

(

.85 1.40 1.30
. 90 )( 1 . 35
)( 1 42 )

)

(

.70 1.15 1.70
. 53 )( 1 . 45 )( 1 . 70
)

,

1.75
1.18
1.18

.

1.05

1.63

1.37

TABLE 9
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Dyads of Initiators

—

and Recipients by Sex, Attraction, and Resources

—

T

Source

df

Initiator

Recipient

1

MS

F

MS

F

1

i

Between Pyads
Sex (S)
Attraction (A)

1

.14

2

6.42

S X A

2

.14

7.50**

6.42

7.50

5^

.86

.09
.86

Resources (R)

2

.74

5.27

2.59

S X R

2

•

CO

3.07

1.51

A X R

4

S X A X R

h

D/SA

•

0 VO

Within Pyads

i

108

DR/SA

P<

.96

1.17

.01

.67

.29
1.26

2.03
)
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Scores are again contingent upon the degree of dyadic
attraction and the resource assignment.

For example, the first cell

(1,65) represents the mean frequency with which one friend

Initiated to the other friend when either was assigned a
resource of 4,

Expected mean frequencies, derived from the

group data of Table

5#

are also given.

Table 9 summarizes

the analysis of variance for Initiators and recipients by dyads,
TOie

group mean of Table 8 and the between-dyads analysis

of Table 9 are Identical with their counterparts In Tables
3 and 4,

Friends initiated to and received offers from each

other more frequently than did acquaintances or strangers.

There was no difference for dyads among

frequency of Initiations,

4,

3,

and 2 In their

In friend and stranger dyauis, 3

initiated the most frequently, but for acquaintance dyads 2
was the most frequent initiator.
ceived more offers than 3>

Although 2 consistently re-

both more than

4,

the resource

assignments did not differ significantly from each other.
Divisions of Payoff
Payoffs were c<xaputed by averaging each groups' division
of the 100 points which were awarded to the winning alliance
of each game,

!Hiub,

the raw scores for each group v^ere means

based only on games In which coalitions were formed.

An

was peranalysis of variance with unequal cell frequencies

divide the
formed to adjust for those groups who did not
There is
payoff in each of the three resource combinations.
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a slight bias In the analysis of variance because
weighted

means rather than simple means were used.

Statistically,

however, there Is very little difference In the obtained
results.

Mean division of payoff by groups and by resource combinations Is given in Table 10,

The cells of this table

represent a weighted average based on the total

sura

of indi-

vidual group means divided by the total number of group means.

For example, if the division of a particular game was 55-45,
only the 55 was used In computing the mean.

Table 11 Is a

summary of the analysis of variance for groups.

Groups did not differ in their mean divisions of payoff.
Nor was there support for the hypothesis that male groups

would agree upon less proportionate divisions of payoffs
than would female groups.
smd females

'

Males' average division was 57 *01

57.53.

The 4-2 resource combination differed significantly from
4-3 and 3-2 (F * 33.

df*

2/9^,

p<

.01),

Further analyses

on the resource mean divisions in Table 10 show that payoffs

were divided according to the parity norm belief

—

an individ-

to
ual o\aght to get from an agreement an amount proportionate

what he brought into It.

The expected mean divisions based

(4-3).
on the noimi are 67.00 (4-2), 60,00 (3“‘2)> and 57.00

different
The observed mean divisions were not significantly
(3-2), and
from the expected divisions: 6l,ll (4-2), 55.22
mean divisions did differ
55.49 ( 4 - 3 ). However, the observed
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TABLE

10

Mean Division of Payoff by Groups
and by Resource Combinations

Resource Combinations

Groups

Group

^-3

^-2

3-2

Friends

55.45

58.89

55.39

56.66

Acquaintances

57.26

62.35

54.53

58.07

Strangers

53.86

62.^42

55.71

57.08

55.49

6l.ll

55.22

57.27

Resource Means^

.

.

Means^

•

.

^Group and resource means are not a simple average of
row and column cell means. They are a weighted average based
on the total sum of Individual group means divided by the
total number of group means.

TABLE

11

Summary of Analysis of Variance for Groups of Division
of Payoff by Sex, Attraction, and Resources

Source

MS

df

SS

F

Between Groups
Sex (S)

Attraction (A)
S X A
G/SA

.09

1

.09

125.66
42.59
3786.98

2

53

62.83
21.29
71.45

910. OM

2

455.02

.21

2

.10

117.84
185.68

4

29.46
46,42

1291.86

9^

13.74

2
.

.

Within Groups
Resources (R)
S X R
A X R
S X A X R

GR/SA

33.11
2.14
3.38
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slgnlfloontly from 50,00, the mean division predicted by

minimum power theory.

When the overall mean division (57,27)

was tested against an expected mean division of 50,00, a

significant difference was obtained (P « 120.99, df lA64,

P<

.01).

Figure

plots mean division of payoff for each resource

combination against four blocks of three games each.

There

was no significant change In the mean divisions of payoff

for the three combinations across games (P - .56).

According

to minimum power theory, one would expect a significant trend

toward more equal divisions; l.e., toward 50.

A slightly

decreasing trend was observed for 3-2 and 4-3 combinations,
but 4-2 Increased somewhat.

Triad members tended to stabilize

their behavior with repeated experience In the experimental
game.

Table 12 presents the mean division of payoff by dyads

within each resource combination.

As In Table 10, the cells

represent a weighted average based on the total sum of each
dyad mean divided by the total member of dyad means.

Table

dyads.
13 summarizes the analysis of variance for

The main effect of Attraction was not significant.
than
Friend dyads divided the payoff more proportionately

stranger control dyads, but contrary to the hypothesis,

acquaintance dyads had the most overall disproportionate
divisions of all dyads.

Figure 5 Plots mean division of

dyad payoff against resource combinations.

The curves for

6?

PAYOFF

OF

DIVISION

MEAN

BLOCKS

Figure

4.

OF

THREE

GAMES

Mean division of payoff by groups

for each resource combination across blocks of games.
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TABUE 12
Mean Division of Payoff by Dyads
and by Resource Combinations

Resource Combinations

Dyads

Dyad
Means®

^-3

A-2

3-2

Friends

55.33

58.39

55.18

56. ^*2

Acquaintances

57.92

63.63

57.35

59.73

Strangers

56.5/1

6HA2

55.6^

58.58

Resource Means®

56.it9

61,71

56.0^

58.15

^Dy&A and resource means are not a simple average of
row and column cell means. They are a weighted average based
on the total sum of Individual dyad means divided by the
total number of dyad means.

TABLE 13
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Dyads of Division
of Payoff by Sex, Attraction, and Resources

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between I^ads
Sex (S)

Attraction (A)
S X A

D/SA
Within Dyads
Resources (R)
S X R

A X R
S X A X R

dr/sa

11.06

1

11.06

13^.79

2

67. Ao

^2,26

2

21.13

3773.78

53

71.20

763.19

2

381.59

50.57
92.50

2
h

25.29
23.13

158.58

4

39.65

1781.11

63

28.27

13.50

1.40
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Figure

5.

Mean division of dyad payoff when

dyad possessed resource combinations of 4-3^ ^-2,
and 3-2.
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acquaintances and strangers are very similar to each other;
both differ from the curve of the friends.

Division of payoff was a function of the resources

assigned to the dyads (P - 13.50, df 2/63,

p<

.01).

Figure

5 clearly Indicates that the ^4-2 resource combination led to

significantly more disproportionate divisions than did the
3-2 or 4-3 combinations.

This result Is In keeping with

the group findings presented earlier and the parity norm

principle of mlnlmisn resource theory.
of a minimum power explanation.

It Is not supportive

The latter position predicts

that the division of payoff In all resource combinations

would be 50-50, l.e., a horizontal line In Figure
mean division of 50.

5 at a

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

Numerous questions are raised by the results of the
last chapter.

One of the most Important questions Is what

theory of coalition formation. If any, best handles the

empirical data of this study?

Are there any general con-

clusions which can be made concerning coalescing behavior
or does most of our knowledge contribute to a sophisticated

"utter confusion theory" described by Gamson (196^1)?

Another important question Is why friends were more cooperative
than acquaintances In this study.

In what ways does prior

dyadic experience affect behavior in an experimental game
situation?

In the competitive board game used In this study,

how can subjects be motivated to become more involved in the

dynamics of the gemie?

The intent of this discussion is to

reflect upon some of these questions and to Integrate the
findings with previous research.
This chapter Is subdivided Into the following areas;

coalition formation theories, dyadic attraction and sex
hypotheses, methodological considerations, and suggestions

for further research.

Within the theoretical areas the

discussion will follow the major dependent variables;

fre-

of
quency of coalitions formed. Initiators and recipients

offers to ally, and divisions of payoff.

72

Coalition Formation Theories

Evidence supporting two major coa3.1tlon theories was

obtained In this study.

One, minimum resource theory, em-

phasizes the Initial resources (power) which subjects bring
to the experimental situation.

Coalitions will form In which

the total resources are as small as possible while still

being sufficient to control the outcome.

Adherence to a

parity norm Is predicted; the belief that a person ought to
get from an agreement an amount proportionate to what he

brought Into It.

The other, minimum power theory, emphasizes

a rational analysis of the outcomes of the situation.

A person’s

pivotal power is the proportion of times his resources can
change a losing coalition Into a winning one.

If participants

are equal In pivotal power no one coalition is more likely to
be formed than any other.

The overall frequency with which coalitions were formed
was generally consistent with minimum resource predictions.

For both groups and dyads, the frequency of coalescing was
3«2 > ^-2 y A-3.

Moreover, for groups and dyads of strangers

the ratio of 3-2 to

i»-2

coalitions was approximately 2:1 as

predicted by Chertkoff (1967).

IT data from the

fj^ same

Kelley &
of three experiments are pooled (Chertkoff, 1966;
goodArrowood, I960; Vlnacke & Arkoff, 1957)* a relatively

minimum resource
fit is found between Chertkoff *s (1967)
data from game
predictions and the obtained data. If the
to the same test, a
one of the present study Is subjected
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good -fit Is also found.

escing are predicted:
•25 (no-coalltlons)
•37 (3-2),

The following percentages of coal.50 (3-2),

.25 (^*-2),

.00 (A-3), and

The obtained percentages were similar:

.

,17 (^-2),

,13 (^-3), and .33 (no-coalltlons).

Thus, minimum resource theory predictions account for the

observed frequency of coalescing early in the series of games.

According to minimum resource theory, the ratio of 3-2
to ^-2 coalitions should remain 2:1 across games with the

percentage of no coalitions approaching zero.
the latter was true but the former was not:

In this study,

no-coalltlons

became very infrequent, but 3-2 and 4-2 alliances converr,ed

over games until they occurred with equal frequency In
Block 4 (cf. Figure

1,

p.51).

The convergence of curves as seen in Figure 1 Is predicted by minimum power theory, l.e., equal Incidence of all
three resource combinations.

Kelley and Arrowood's (i960)

resource combinations also tend to converge across games;
however, their number of games

with an average of 26
this study.

—

—

ranging from 10 to 70

was considerably greater than In

With regard to frequency of coalition formation,

then, minimum resource theory most accurately predicts

behavior during the first games while minimum power theory
predicts behavior most accurately In later games.

Data from Initiators and recipients of offers to
provided partial support for both theories.

allj^

With regard to

all players
the Initiators of coalitions. It was found that

7^

Initiated with approximately the same frequency.
the player assigned a resource of

However,

Initiated relatively

Infrequently during the first few games but became very
active during the last games.

Theoretically, the Initiator's

behavior early In the experimental session was consistent

with minimum resource predictions, while In the latter
portion of the session his behavior conformed more to minimum

power notions.

This significant trend across games reveals

that learning In the experiment was very rapid and that

players became aware of the objective power relationships

early In the sequence of games.

Results of recipients of

coalitions clearly supported minimum resource theory.

The

player who possessed a resource of 2 was the most frequent

recipient of offers to ally.

Perhaps, his low resource

assignment provided the Initiator with the opportunity to

demand the greatest proportion of the payoff.

Kelley and

Arrowood (i960) also report that the player with the smallest
amount of resources was the preferred coalition partner.

Minimum resource theory received additional support
from the division of payoff results.

The parity norm was

adhered to throughout the sequence of games (of. Figure
p, 67).

Tests of the observed mean divisions against those

expected by the norm were not significant.

However, the

expected mean
mean divisions differed significantly from an
power theory.
of 50.00 which Is predicted by minimum

I
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Finally, coalition formation was affected by the degree
of attraction between players.

Consistent with the results

of Vlnacke and colleagues, the dominant strategy for strangers

was for the two players with the smallest amount of resources
to band together against the player with the largest amount

of resources.

Thus, the behavior of non-formed dyads

ported minimum resource theory.

sup*-

On the other hand, formed

dyads (friends) conformed more closely to a minimum power

Interpretation.

The greater the di^adlc attraction, the less

accurately minimum resource theory predicted frequency of
allying.

These findings are directly opposed to the suggested

advice given by Oamson (1964) to minimum power theorists.
He suggested that they

’’use

subjects who have no established

social relationships with each other and no prospects of a

continuing relationship after the experiment”

(p.

105 ).

In

the present study. It was the ’’strangers" who adhered most

closely to the expectations of minimum resource theory.

Con-

versely, subjects with the most firmly established relation-

ships were the ones who supported minimum power theory the
most.

Perhaps, Gamson*s advice should be taken with a

”graln-of-salt”
resource and
In summary, while support for both minimum

were most
minimum power theories was obtained, the results

consistent with minimum resource predictions.

The greatest

composed of strangers,
evidence came from (1) groups or dyads
of
and formed during the first block
(2) coalitions Initiated
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three games, (3) divisions of payoff throughout the
sequence
of games, and

(i*)

recipients of coalition offers.

Minimum

power predictions were primarily supported by (1) changes
in the frequency of coalitions initiated and formed after

the first block of games, and (2) groups or dyads composed

of friends.
It is concluded that, at present, minimum resource

theory offers the best explanation of coalescing behavior.
The two findings supportive of minimum power theory appear
to be discrepant with minimum resource predictions.

However,

it is suggested that an equity or parity norm may account

for these findings as well.
First, changes across games are observed in the fre-

quency with which coalitions are initiated and formed by
players possessing various resources.

If player A allies

with player B in a particular game and B benefits the most
from the alliance, it is only equitable or "fair” that he
reciprocate the favor in a later game.

In this manner, A

may then receive an amount proportionate to his investments
(parity norm).

Thus, the norm states that one should benefit

those who have benefited him; one should pay his "debts.”
experimental
If this norm is envoked by players during an
session, alliances will occur in all resource combinations,
favor.
depending upon which player owes another player a
more frequently
This may be one explanation why ^ initiates
a frequency
over games and why ^*-3 ooalltlons occur with
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greater than zero.
Secondly, players with prior dyadic experience form

coalitions more equally In all resource combinations than
players with no prior experience.

Prior established relation-

ships weaken minimum resource predictions.

Attracted dyads

enter the experimental setting having already formed an
alliance.

In effect, they have played a number of games In

which Investments have been made and debts Incurred,

Accord-

ing to the parity norm, each member of the dyad would be ex-

pected to benefit the other member because of their past

exchanges.

In many real-life situations (including labora-

tory research), the amount of resources one possesses may

actually be less Important than the Interpersonal relationship one has with another person.

In other words, relation-

ships with others are often more salient than the "distribution
of resources."

pyadlc Attraction Hypotheses

Based upon an exchange theory of interaction, a distinction was made among dyads of varying degrees of attraction.

Non-formed or stranger dyads exchanged rewards and costs for
the first time In the experimental situation.

Forming or

acquaintance dyads had Interacted prior to the experiment
Involvement with
and were assumed to have experienced some
attracted to
each other. Formed or friend dyads were highly
prior to the
each other and had interacted In some depth
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©xperlment.

Generally, these dyads were roommates.

It was predicted that friends and acquaintances would be

more cooperative In an experimental game than would strangers;
furthermore, friends were expected to be more competitive than

acquaintances.

Cooperative behavior was measured as a high

frequency of dyad alliances and mutual Initiations together

with proportionate divisions of the payoff.
As predicted, friend dyads Initiated and formed more

coalitions than stranger dyads.

Contrary to expectations,

acquaintance dyads did not Initiate or coalesce more frequently
than friend or stranger dyads.

Moreover, dyads did not differ

significantly In their mean divisions of payoff.

However,

consistent with the other findings, the trend was for friends
to divide the payoff most proportionately, then strangers, and

acquaintances most disproportionately.

maximize their

.joint outcomes,

Friends played to

while acquaintances and

strangers generally played to maximize their Individual outcomes.

All dependent measures showed that friends were con-

sistently more cooperative than acquaintances and strangers.
Why were friends more cooperative than acquaintances In
the present experimental game situation?

One explanation is

to comthat friends find It more rewarding to cooperate than

pete.

for his
It Is more rewarding to ally with a friend,

gains are also one’s own gains.

Moreover, one’s costs are

similar to
greatly reduced when he Interacts with someone

himself.

In Thlbaut and Kelley's terms (1959).

"friendship
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reflects a more complete correspondence of outcomes
or

commonality of interests" (p, 210).

As rewarding behavior is

reciprocated, each partner experiences greater and greater

positive outcomes from the relationship.

from rewarding the other.

Each derives pleasure

Ey the nature of their relation-

ship they have, in effect, formed an alliance before entering
the experimental setting.

The greater their attraction, the

greater their allegiance in everyday situations.

Therefore,

when a highly attracted dyad is placed into a coalition game,
the alliance which they brought with them into the game setting

continues and they ally more frequently with each other rather
than with someone neither of them know.

Their behavior in the

game is but one small segment of their interpersonal interaction

which extends into the past and is expected to extend into
the future.
A second explanation suggests that the original hypotheses

are correct, but only in situations where the costs of competition are minimal.

Perhaps the monetary payoff in the present

study was so rewarding that it was too costly for friends not
to cooperate.

If money had not been used as payoff, friends

could have rivaled and competed against each other with only

minimal costs.

With the introduction of money as payoff,

involved
however, the players were more highly motivated and
in the game.

Consistent with the first explanation given

with someone
above, friends would rather share their winnings
know.
they liked than with someone they didn’t

Furthermore,
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because of the formed nature of their relationship, they
could expect a more equitable division of the payoff with

their friend than with a stranger.
It should be mentioned that the

hypotheses of this study

were formulated prior to the decision to use monetary payoff.
At that time the reward for winning a game was simply 100
points.

With such low costs In the situation, the reasoning

and expectations given in Chapter II were highly tenable.

The

research of various other Investigators supported the notion
that formed relationships would be more competitive tham

forming relationships (Berkowitz, 1958; Gamson, 196lb; Thibaut
& Kelley, 1959),

More recently, Gamson (1984), In offering

advice to an anticompetitive theorist, also suggested that
subjects should not ”be so close that they feel comfortable

with the open expression of conflict; their relationships
should be fragile enough that the tension created by vigorous

bargaining is a threat.

Polite acquaintances who value each

other *s good opinion and propriety in the conduct of social
relationships should support anticompetitive theory In their
coalition behavior" (p. 105).

Monetary rewards were Introduced into the procedure
after pilot groups had played the game.

Tlie

most prevalent

would
made by the pilot subjects was that they
money involved. Alhave behaved differently had there been
the game would have
most all pilot subjects commented that
they been playing for
been more Interesting and "fun" had

suggestion
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real money.

Thus, It was decided to Incorporate monetary

payoff Into the procedure before the sixty experimental

groups were run.
l^ie

only standard coalition study which has used monetary

payoff manipulated different types of Incentive conditions
(e.g.. Immediate payoff, delayed payoff), but not different

levels of payoff (Vlnacke, 196^1).

were found between conditions.

No significant differences

However, It has been shown

that game playing behavior may be strikingly different when

subjects are playing for real rather than Imaginary money
(Gallo & McCllntock, 19^5 )

Deutsch and Krauss'

.

Gallo's experiment replicated

(19^0) simulated trucking game.

In con-

trast to the uncooperative behavior exhibited by subjects

playing under Imaginary money conditions, subjects playing

under real money conditions cooperated In order to win a
large

sura

of money.

It was also found that "the real money

^s showed an entirely different pattern of play than the

Imaginary money Ss" (p. ?6).

For example, dyads playing for

real money showed an Increase In cooperative behavior over
trials and a decrease In the use of threats.

In retrospect,

then, the original attraction hypotheses may have been

supported If a monetary payoff had not been given.

It Is

concluded that friends were more cooperative than acquaintances
because they found It more rewarding to cooperate than to
compete and because the monetary payoff made It too costly
for friends not to cooperate.
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Finally, brief mention should be made of the similarity

between the behaviors of acquaintances and strangers.

Stranger

groups were composed of three randomly selected subjects.
The only restriction was that none had chosen the others on
the "student Questionnaire."

from the

s€ime

Thus, strangers were selected

class so that a soclometrlc measure was avail-

able for determining the composition of groups.

Although

th»?

classes were large, strangers In the same experimental group
may have seen one another prior to the experiment.

The other

participants In one*s group may not have been "total"
strangers

—

their faces may have loolced "familiar."

It Is

possible, therefore, that acquaintances and strangers were

more similar to each other than were acquaintances and friends.
Ideally, strangers should have been Individuals who had never

seen each other before.
group.

This may not have been true In every

Where It was not true, the game behavior of acquaintances

and strangers would be expected to resemble each other somewhat.

Other researchers have found, for example, that "unacquainted"
and "fairly friendly" subjects did not differ In their level
of cooperation In a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Oskamp &

Perlman, 1965)*
Sex liypotheses

algnlfloantly
As predicted, males Initiated and formed
unsucoeeaful
more coalitions than did females. In addition,
by males than by
attempts to ally were made more frequently
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females;

6556 of

the unsuccessful attempts were made by males

and 35^ by females.

Thus, male behavior was generally more

competitive than female behavior.

Consistent with previous results (Bond & Vlnacke, I96I;
Vlnackej 1959i 1962; Vlnacke & Stanley, 1962), then, support

was obtained for exploitative (masculine) and accommodative
(feminine) strategies of play.

A procedural modification in

the present study eliminated one alternative frequently

chosen by females

—

the formation of triple alliances.

The

rationale for the exclusion of this alternative was simply
to provide a more stringent test of the bond of attraction

between friends and acquaintances.

The alternatives were to

play independently or to coalesce with a strsuiger or a friend

(acquaintance).

Therefore, it was more difficult for all of

the players to band together than in studies which permitted

triple alliances.
Interestingly, however, several female triads actually

formed a type of triple alliance.

One method was to rotate

alliances among the three players in a consistent pattern

without regard to resource assignments; the three players
would end up equally if all divisions of payoff were 50-50.
play
A second method employed by one female triad was to

independently on all games and never coalesce.

They reasoned

a weight of 4
that each player would probably be assigned
points their
equally often and if 4 always received the 100
was correct; each
winnings would be equal. Their reasoning

8^

received

^0

points or one dollar.

Both of these methods

were forms of accommodative strategy.
The hypothesis that males would agree upon less proportionate divisions of payoff than females was not supported.
This may have been due, in part, to the adherence by most subjects to a parity norm belief.

The data Indicated that the

100 points were generally divided according to the resources

assigned to the players.

It was not too surprising that

females adhered to this norm.

If, In fact, females were oriented

"toward the end of arriving at an equitable or *falr' outcome
of maximum satisfaction (or at least Justice) to all con-

cerned" (Bond & Vlnacke, 19^1,

p.

71-72), divisions of payoff

according to a parity norm vjould further this objective.
Each player would receive an amount proportionate to his
Investment.

This would have been the most equitable and fair

agreement that could have been reached.

To have divided the

payoff In a 50-50 split may have been perceived as inequitable;
one player would have received too much for his investment

and the other too little.

Deviation from the norm toward

50-50 divisions would only have occurred If the players ad-

hered to an equalizing norm rather than to a parity norm.
not deviate
It Is perhaps more surprising that males did
fi»om the parity

norm to a greater extent than they did.

Be-

one would expect
cause of their competitiveness In bargaining,
procedure of
greater departures from the norm. However, the
to propose counterthis study did not permit a third party

.

85
offers to those discussing a possible alliance
until a oneminute time limit had expired. This restriction
may have

restrained the amount of bargaining displayed by the
players.
In general, the findings of this study support the re-

sults of Vlnaoke and colleagues i

males. Individually or

collectively, were primarily concerned with winning, whereas

females were more concerned with arriving at an equitable

outcome

Methodological Considerations
Tlie

major methodological consideration concerns how one

can make the experimental situation more realistic and in-

volving for the participants.

As the game Is now played,

subjects quickly learn that It Is determined; that one must
be In an alliance to win.

A person with a resource assignment

of 2 or 3 can never win without forming an alliance.

There

are two potential ways In which motivation can be Increased
In the game and greater Involvement achieved.

l^e first is to allow each player to throw his own die

rather than move simultaneously with the other players after
the experimenter has thrown the die.

If each player were

allowed to throw his own die and move Independently of the
other players, the game would be perceived as Involving much
more risk.

If there were numerous spaces on the game board,

still
the person with the largest resource assignment would

win.

Although the game would become more probabilistic, It
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would Qssentlally remain determined.

It is suggested that

with non -simultaneous throws of the die^ fewer overall coalitions will be formed.

It is further suggested that more

unsuccessful Initiations will be attempted under nonsimultaneous than under simultaneous conditions.

Players

will prefer "to go it alone" or be risk-takers rather than
accept an offer which does not meet their approval.

Theo-

retically, the non-simultaneous condition would be an inter-

esting test of minimum resource and minimum power theories.
Do the two weaker players form more coalitions under this

condition than under a simultaneous condition or do coalitions

form more equally among all resource combinations?
The second way in which Involvement may be Increased

‘is

to allow unlimited bargaining while offers to ally are being

exchanged and debated.

As the game was played in thl? study,

the player not Included in a discussion was not allowed to

Interrupt until a one-minute time limit had expired.

This

restriction may have reduced the amount of competitiveness

displayed by the players in two related ways.

First, without

counter-offers from a third player, members of a bargaining
dyad may have been reluctant not to accept an offer when it
was given.

Second, because of this reluctance, the frequency

disproportionately
of unsuccessful initiations may have been
low.

one
There was a definite risk Involved in rejecting

third player.
offer while hoping for a better deal with the
be achieved through
If accurate recording and coding could

restriction could be
mechanical devices, the communication
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eliminated in favor of unlimited bargaining.

It lo suggested

that with greater freedom to Initiate offers and
counter-

offers, competitive behavior of the players would Increase.
It would be very Interesting to determine, for example. If

unlimited bargaining would result In more competitive be-

havior between members of friend dyads.
Suggestions for Further Research

Numerous questions for further research are suggested by
this study.

The effects of varying amounts of monetary payoff

on coalescing behavior should be Investigated.

Another area

for fruitful research Is an exaunlnatlon of the effects of

various resource and payoff contingencies on changes from

game to game In coalescing behavior.

Finally, Interdependen-

cies among group members could be measured and then effect
on coalescing behavior determined.

Let us briefly consider

each of these suggestions.
The results of this study suggest that If payoff is low
In a competitive game situation, friends can rival and oppose

one another Incurring little cost from their exchange.

If

payoff Is high, however. It may be costly for friends not to
cooperate.

To compete would result In lower overall outcomes

for both than would a cooperative alliance.

Therefore, It Is

heighten
suggested that Increasing the stake or payoff would
acquaintances
the differences In coalescing behavior between

and friends.

With Increased payoff, It becomes even more
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valuable to reward one’s friend and more costly
to compete
with him. With very large stakes, such as several
thousand
dollars. It would not be In the friends' best Interests
to

compete and Include a stranger In on the payoff.

With very

small stakes, such as winning points or Imaginary money, the

friends may actually find It rewarding to rival and oppose

each other; there are no, or few, costs Incurred,

Thus, the

greater the payoff In a competitive situation, the greater
should be the differences In cooperative behavior between
formed and forming relationships,

Non-formed (stranger)

relationships should maintain the same strategy throughout
payoff levels

—

an adherence to a parity norm of Inter-

personal exchange.

It would, of course, be Important to

determine the utility of the payoff for each person.

Ten

dollars would not be valued equally by all participants,
A second area for further research Is an analysis of
the effects of various resource and payoff contingencies

on game to game changes In coalescing behavior.

Which player

Initiates an offer to ally, which player accepts the offer,
and the terms of their agx*eement may depend on (l) the resources
possessed by each pleiyer during the preceding game and (2) the

accumulated outcomes of all preceding games.

That Is,

coalitions formed. Initiators and recipients of offers to ally,
be
and/or divisions of payoff during a particular game could

contingent upon resources assigned and outcomes obtained
experimental situation
during the previous game(s). Thus, the

.
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could be structured with the nerabers of each
group asslcnod
a pre -determined sequence of weights rather
than a random

assignment as in the present study.

For example, each player

could keep the same weight throughout the sequence of
games
Kelley and Arrowood's study (i960), or each player could
be assigned one weight for X games, another weight for X more

games,

ej^

cetera .

E(y

keeping resource assignments constant

from game to game, changes In coalescing behavior can be
systematically observed.

It would also be possible to con-

struct a mathematical model to predict future coalescing

behavior
Finally, It is suggested that interdependencies among

group members may detemlne the nature of their coalescing
behavior.

Most relationships are asymmetrical in that one

member may have more invested in the relationship, may be
more dependent upon it, or may be more highly attracted to
it than the other meraber(s).

Initiations and concessions

of bargaining, for example, may be a function of the degree
of attraction between partners.

It is suggested that the

person with the smallest investment in the relationship

should make fewer offers to ally and demand a larger share
of the payoff than the person with the greatest Investment.

latter person should be very receptive to offers from
the payhis partner and agreeable to his proposed division of

off.

the
A more refined measure of attraction is needed than

sociometric questionnaire used in this study

.

One should be

90

abl6 to aosess the Interdependenolee of the partners,
their

degree of Involvement in and oommltment to the relationship,
and their satisfaction with the present association as opposed
to alternative relationships*
If the interdependencies among group members have been

assessed, it would be of interest to vary the composition of
the three-person group*

For ejcample, all group members could

be friends or all could be acquaintances*

The frequency with

which coalitions are initiated and formed between the three
friend dyads as well as their agreed upon divisions of payoff
should reflect the interdependencies of the members.

It would

also be interesting to observe the frequency with whic)\ three

friends would form triple alliances as opposed to the number
formed by three acquaintances or three strangers.

Furthermore

the groups could be composed of attracted dyads and a stranger
as in the present study, but the stranger could be an

accomplice of the experimenter.

The role of the accomplice

would consist of presenting various prearranged offers to the

members of the attracted dyad in order to test the strength
of the bonds within the dyad*

The amount of monetary payoff

and
could be manipulated so that alliances between a friend

between
the stranger would be more rewarding than alliances

friends.

one
How large would the payoff need to be before

friend?
friend allied with the stranger against the other

rewards in an
Or, would friends forego easily attained
a lower monetary
alternate relationship and band together for
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payoff?

In other words, what Is the cost of
friendship?

The results of the present experiment suggest
that the greater
the Interpersonal attraction, the greater the
resistance will
be for accepting a high monetary payoff with a stranger

rather than a less rewarding alliance with one's partner.
Summary and Conclusions

While support for both minimum resource and minimum
power theories was obtained In this study. It Is concluded
that

ralnlmiara

resource theory currently offers the best

explanation of coalescing behavior.

It was supported by

evidence from (l) groups or dyads composed of strangers,
(2)

coalitions Initiated and fomed during the first block

of three games,

(3) divisions of payoff throughout the sequence

of games, and (4) recipients of coalition offers.

Minimum

power predictions were primarily supported by (1) changes In
the frequency of coalitions initiated and formed after the

first block of three games, and (2) groups or dyads composed
of friends.

It Is suggested that a parity norm (minimum

resource theory) also accounts for the findings supportive
of minimum power theory:

one should benefit those who have

benefited him during previous games.
Only partial support was obtained for the attraction

hypotheses.

As predicted, friend dyads Initiated and formed

more coalitions than stranger dyads.

But, contrary to

or coalesce
expectations, acqiiaintance dyads did not Initiate
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more frequently than friend or stranger
dyads.

Moreover,

dyads did not differ signlfloantly in their
divisions of
payoffs.

Friends played to maximize their

.lolnt outoomes,

while acquaintances and strangers generally played to
maximize their individual outcomes. It is concluded that friends
were more cooperative than acquaintances because they found
it more rewai\iing to cooperate than to compete and because

the monetary payoff made it too costly for friends not to

cooperate.
As expected, males formed significantly more coalitions

than did females.

They also Initiated successful and un-

successful offers to ally more frequently than did females.
However, no support was found for the hypothesis that males

would agree upon less proportionate divisions of payoff than
females.

Both males and females adhered to the parity norm

in dividing the payoff.

It is concluded that r.^les were

generally concerned with winning (exploitative behavior)

whereas females were more concerned with arriving at an
equitable outcome (accommodative behavior).

Two methods of motivating subjects to become more

Involved in the competitive board game were suggested.

The

first was to allow each player to throw his own die rather
than move simultaneously with the other players.

The

second was to allow unlimited bargaining while offers to
ally were being exchanged and debated.

Suggested areas for

effects of
further research included investigations of the

.
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(l)

varying amounts of monetary payoff, (2) various resource

and payoff contingencies, and (3) Interdependencies among

group members on coalescing behavior.
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STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Name:

rast

Campus

Sex:

^

Initial

Acldx*esBt

Class:
(clrole one)
freshman sophomore

Phone:

Junior

senior

graduate

special

Major:

Area of Interest within major:

.

.

Career plane :
List the full name for as many as six persons in this class
of your own sex that you know and like:

abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
abcdefgh
For each name, circle all letters that correctly describe
your relationship with ihat person. At least one letter will
prc^bably apply to each person:
a * a person you know well -• a "best friend".
]0

- your roommate.

c • a sorority sister or fraternity brother.

d - a resident of your dormitory or house floor.
e « a person you see frequently in social situations.
(for excunple: double dates, parties, movies. Hatch, etc.)
f « a person you have known for one year or longer.

^

a person with whom you are Just beginning to associate.

acquainted.
h - a person with whom you hope to become better

4

